The German Foreign
Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, spoke at the Ambassadors Conference in Paris
on August 29, 2014. In preliminary remarks, he thanked his host, Laurent Fabius, and
praised the durability of the Franco-German alliance. He then went on to enumerate six rules (or "hypotheses") for Europe.
* * *
Excellencies, Europe is currently faced with issues which
are key to its future. We have the European elections behind us, we’re saying
good bye to one EU Commission and welcoming a new one which will have to tackle
major challenges.So it makes sense for this panel to turn its attention to the
big question: what direction should Europe take in the next five years?However,
we all know that we can’t look at this major question on its own. For these issues
come at a time when Europe faces an almost overwhelming number of threats:
Ukraine and Russia, Gaza, Syria and the perilous situation in northern Iraq, to
name just those crises which are taking up most of our attention at present.To
use an image: we cannot get the good ship Europe out of the water to refurbish
it in a shipyard. Rather, we have to secure Europe and make it seaworthy while
out in the high seas and in the eye of the storm.If you were to ask Laurent and
myself about Europe’s future today, then we would reply from the ship’s machine
room with, as it were, our sleeves rolled up.From this practical perspective, I
want today to outline – as succinctly as possible – six hypotheses about Europe
and about the role of Germany and France.
My first hypothesis is that the way in which we respond to
these crises will shape Europe for years to come. These responses will
certainly not only shape Europe’s foreign policy but Europe as a whole, its
position in the world and how it perceives itself.For we have long since known
that if we – by that I mean Germany, France and its neighbours – want to
protect ourselves and be a “force formatrice” in this world, we can only
achieve it together.The current threats make that all the clearer. To date, we
Europeans have taken a united stand and that’s only right: we’ve just made a
joint decision to support the Kurds in northern Iraq against the murderous ISIS
gangs.I believe that if we stick together and act intelligently then historians
will one day look back and say: these foreign policy crises fostered
integration in Europe’s foreign policy, just as the financial and monetary
crisis fostered a more integrated European economic policy.
My second hypothesis is that the mark of European foreign
policy isn’t identical interests but, rather, our absolute determination to
ultimately stand together and take joint action.This determination to stand
united is the heartbeat of the European Union. France and Germany have forged
it – despite differing interests and despite the scars left by history.Europe’s
determination to stand united is being especially tested by the Ukraine crisis.
Naturally, European countries have very different historical relations with
Russia. For some in the West, Russia is a fairly distant trading partner, but
for many in the East, it remains in their memory as the country which oppressed
them for decades. And for Germany – with its divided history – it’s a bit of
both.Just a few weeks ago, I addressed the Ambassadors Conference of our friends
in Poland. There I said that despite all the different experiences in Europe,
we all – whether we be Poles, Germans or French – share the conviction that
Europe’s peaceful order is our greatest achievement since the dark chapters of
the 20th century. What’s more, we will defend it together – with pressure on
the one hand and political offers on the other, just as we have done, and will
continue to do, in close Franco‑German coordination in the Foreign Affairs Council, in the
Weimar Triangle, in the “Normandy Four” group and in other initiatives.
My third thesis is that European foreign policy means a
division of labour.This begins with a joint analysis but it includes taking
pragmatic and joint action: whenever and wherever we can achieve something,
always with the partners and resources that can help us do this.This division
of labour doesn’t mean: to each his own and every man for himself!The idea is
not: Germany understands Russia and France understands Africa, so Germany
should deal with the East and France with the South. That’s not how it works!German
foreign policy makers are aware that Africa is a neighbouring continent with
huge opportunities, as well as very concrete threats. Whether Africa really is,
as some suspect, the “Asia of the 21st century” in economic terms, isn’t clear
yet. However, we know today that a new middle class in Africa is heading
towards a better future, that in terms of population numbers alone, Africa is
set to double its weight to two billion people by 2050. On the other hand,
there’s a danger that fragile statehood, radical Islamism and conflicts over
scarce resources will ignite new crises and flows of refugees. Europe cannot be
indifferent to this.That’s why we have a joint, a European strategic interest
in Africa and we have to pursue it together – each country with its own
approach and its own strengths.Despite all of this, the differences between
Germany, France and the other European partners don’t represent a weakness. On
the contrary, if we put our specific capabilities, traditions, tools and
channels of communication to use, then these differences will be transformed
into a strength. Then European foreign policy will be more than the sum of many
small parts.
My fourth hypothesis is that European foreign policy needs
all 28.In the debate inflamed by populist forces, people are too quick to ask:
can’t there be a Europe without Britain?My response is: can there be a European
foreign policy without Britain? Definitely not!Take the Gaza conflict, for
example. The E3 – France, Germany and Britain – have put concrete proposals for
Europe’s contribution to peace on the table. The E3 play a crucial role in the
negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme. And, not least, Britain is
crucial to an alliance which continues to be Europe’s most important: the alliance
across the Atlantic.
My fifth hypothesis is that Europe’s foreign policy needs
the entire toolbox of diplomacy.I asked at the start of my second term of
office as German Foreign Minister: what responsibilities does German foreign
policy have, are we setting the right priorities, are we acting quickly enough
and what instruments do we have in our toolbox?We can ask similar questions
about Europe: are we really using all the instruments in the toolbox, from the
long‑term
stabilisation of economies and the rule of law to acute crisis management? Are
we quick enough?Are we using our resources in an optimal manner?In the Review
2014 process I launched within the Federal Foreign Office, we’ve taken a
conscious decision to look beyond Germany and are seeking inspiration from our
friends and partners in order to find the answers to these questions.Naturally,
we’re also looking to France. For France has long since been a consummate
player in the diplomatic arena: bilaterally, in a regional context and at a global
level, as France’s active role in the United Nations shows.You manage time and
again, Laurent, to adapt your toolbox in keeping with the times.On the one
hand, that applies to issues as, for example, illustrated by the intensive
manner in which you have dealt with the major questions of the future – energy
and the climate – here in the Quai, quite concretely the 2015 climate summit,
in the preparation of which we want to cooperate closely. Or the importance
which you attach to the promotion of foreign trade and investment, economic
diplomacy.On the other hand, it applies to processes – including more technical
things, such as diplomatic telegrams. Le Monde has called your new information
system a “Facebook for diplomats”. If you will allow me to remain with this
image, I would press the “like” button in recognition of this courage to adopt
new practices.
For my sixth and last hypothesis, I want to look inwards
from the outside.If we foreign policy makers call for Europe to play a greater
role in the world, then we also have to look inside Europe itself. Which is to
say, Europe needs an internal structure that allows it to take action
externally. Firstly, this means that we need the highest possible degree of
European coordination in all the major issues we face at international level:
from climate and energy policy to data protection and rules for the Internet.
If we can’t formulate common European approaches to these issues, then we have
no chance of doing so at global level.However, I’m talking about more than
issues:Europe’s internal structure needs to preserve everything that makes
Europe a strong player in the international arena. What makes Europe attractive
in people’s eyes?I believe it’s the unique European model which combines both
freedom and cohesion, the market economy and the welfare state, competitiveness
and social justice. These are the two sides of the European coin.Managing to
strike this balance time and again is the main challenge not only for
individual governments – most certainly for the French Government in these
turbulent times – but also for the next EU Commission.
So far, so good. I know that six hypotheses are one more
than the ideal essay comprises, or at least that’s what is taught at the ENA
... Perhaps we can get rid of one in the course of our discussion. I’m looking
forward to the debate with you!
* * *
Speech
by Foreign Minister Steinmeier at the Ambassadors Conference in Paris, Federal
Foreign Office, August 29, 2014
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