The following three editorials translated by MEMRI give the Saudi perspective on recent American foreign policy. There is estrangement just about across the board, though it does seem rather absurd to treat the American gestures toward Iran as constituting a real detente. There is little evidence of that. Questions must also be raised about the degree of Saudi complicity in fueling the rebellion against Assad, a revolt begun in the confident expectation it could be quickly won, a very costly miscalculation. Saudi fury at US policy toward Egypt is also notable, though the US role actually seems rather marginal in shaping events there. The current outcome in Egypt--the Muslim Brotherhood in the gallows, the military back in charge--is what the Saudis wanted. The United States exerted little pressure against that outcome. What's not to like?
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'Al-Hayat'
Deputy-Editor: The Saudi Leadership Must Receive Clear Answers Regarding The
Questions That Trouble It
The deputy-editor of the
London-based Saudi daily Al-Hayat, Jamil Al-Dhiyabi, listed the reasons for the
crisis in Saudi-U.S. relations, including America's support for the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, its rapprochement and secret negotiations with Iran, and
its hesitant policy in Syria. He charged the Saudi leadership to demand
clarifications from Obama regarding these causes of concern, which, he said,
affect the future of the entire region. He wrote: "After the White House
announced President Obama's intention to visit Riyadh, most analysts agree that
there is a large, obvious 'fracture' in U.S.-Saudi relations, and that it must
be healed, because Riyadh is an old Washington ally.
"We must correct those who
claim that the alliance between the two countries is based on the equation of
oil in return for defense of Saudi Arabia. [The fact is that] there are many
reasons for this relationship, including that Saudi Arabia is a strategic and
influential country that is defended by its [own] people and by its high status
and [large] influence in the Arab and Islamic world. This alliance is based on
mutual interests, like all alliances among nations and peoples.
"Obviously, Saudi Arabia has
red lines regarding its security and the security of the Gulf and the [entire]
region, which is rife with unrest and instability, and is [threatened by]
countries and elements boasting that they have become Washington's closest allies.
[These countries and elements] include Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood [MB],
who wish to spread from Egypt to the Arab Gulf with the assistance of countries
in the region, such as Qatar and Turkey. This may be the root of the crisis
between Riyadh and Washington. Saudi Arabia expressed great chagrin over the
White House's policy on the Egypt events, after it became clear that Washington
welcomed the MB takeover of the Egyptian revolution…
"The chasm [between the U.S.
and Saudi Arabia] widened after Washington adopted weak and hesitant positions
vis-à-vis the Bashar Al-Assad regime's determination to kill its own people [in
Syria], threaten the region with sectarian war, and set fires in all the
countries of the region. Likewise, even though it was clear from the outset
that support for the Free Syrian Army [FSA] would have been enough to create a
military and strategic balance [of power] that could [topple] Assad and usher
in [a different] regime that would fulfill Syrians' ambitions for justice and liberty,
influential American elements insisted on delaying this [i.e., Assad's fall].
[This was followed by] President Obama's hesitation [in fulfilling] his promise
to attack the Assad regime… and his clinging to the Geneva conference [on Syria
as a way out of the crisis – a conference] which did nothing to actualize the
aspirations of the Syrians and of the peoples of the region.
"The sides drifted even farther apart
after it was revealed that Washington and Tehran had conducted secret talks for
several months on the coast of the Gulf and in a Gulf country (Oman), producing
a 'carrot and stick' agreement regarding the Iranian nuclear program – without
even considering the interests of the Gulf states, [to the point of] ignoring
them in order to win Iran's sympathy!
"Riyadh did not object to this
[U.S.-Iran] agreement, and even welcomed it, provided that it would result in
arrangements spreading the required security in the region, and that [the
Iranians'] intentions would be honest. However, the Saudis are entitled to
consider their own interests and the interests of the Gulf states, and the
dangers that they face, if [they feel that] the true price of the West-Iran
agreement is enabling Tehran to take over the Gulf and to swallow up the Arab
world. This, specially since Iran has long arms in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and
Bahrain, which completely undermines regional security, Saudi and Gulf
interests, and the desire of the peoples of the region for security in their
own countries.
"The Saudi 'outrage' may be
one of the biggest factors that eventually caused Washington to understand that
the rift and cooling in bilateral [Saudi-U.S.] relations could worsen and lead
to 'damage' that would be hard to mend quickly. It is this that brought about
the U.S. [diplomatic] activity that followed Secretary of State John Kerry's
Riyadh visit, and also brought about the quick adjustment of President Obama's
itinerary for his Europe visit at the end of this month to include Riyadh.
"White House Press Secretary
Jay Carney made clear and detailed statements on February 3 regarding the
upcoming Obama-King 'Abdallah talks in Riyadh: 'The President looks forward to
discussing with King Abdullah the enduring and strategic ties between the
United States and Saudi Arabia as well as ongoing cooperation to advance a
range of common interests related to Gulf and regional security, peace in the
Middle East, countering violent extremism, and other issues of prosperity and
security.'
"Clearly, whatever the extent
of the 'rift' and coolness in Riyadh-Washington relations, they will not end
with a severing of relations, as some in the East and West allege. The best
proof of this is Carney's statement: 'The president very much looks forward to
the visit where all of those areas will be discussed in meetings. And whatever
differences we may have do not alter the fact this is a very important and
close partnership.'
"Anyone who looks at modern
political history and at Saudi-U.S. relations will see that, while they have
faced tough tests, the gaps have always been bridged. Following 9/11, everyone
thought relations would never be the same, but the current test [of the
relations] between these two allies could be the harshest and leave the most
lasting impact yet. If that turns out to be the case, it concerns not just a
single country, but the future of the entire region. Riyadh and Washington know
very well all these aspects of their relations, which are bound to remain
strong even in the face of serious obstacles.
"[During] Obama's visit in
Riyadh, the Saudi leadership must not gloss over the weakness of his policy,
[but] must receive clear answers from him on questions that concern Riyadh
vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear program and its disastrous consequences for the Gulf states
and the region. [It must also obtain a promise from Obama that he will] cease
his consent to Nouri Al-Maliki's despicable actions [in Iraq], and
[clarifications regarding] the Syrian crisis, which has seen constant bloodshed
for over three years, and regarding other pressing regional matters.
"There is also the question of
the nature of future [U.S.-Saudi] relations."
Saudi
Columnist: U.S. Policy On The Gulf Harms Its Security
In his March 26, 2014 column in the
Saudi government daily Al-Riyadh, Saudi columnist Dr. Mutlaq Al-Mutairi
criticized Obama's Middle East policy and argued that the Gulf states should
not pay the price for the U.S. administration's weakness. He wrote:
"...U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice said: 'During his visit to the
kingdom, [President] Obama will express his commitment to Gulf security' –
[but] the type of commitment to be offered by Obama was not defined.
"Gulf security is facing
challenges, the primary one being the U.S. policy towards it. This is because
the [U.S.] policy that is preparing Iran to enter into political and security
agreements [with the U.S. and the West] at the expense of the Gulf [states]
cannot be interpreted as commitment to protecting [Gulf] security. President
Obama's description of Iranian policy as 'strategic rather than impulsive,' and
[his claim] that the Iranians 'have a worldview and see their interests and
respond to costs and benefits,' [do not] strengthen Gulf security, particularly
when they are accompanied by the U.S. silence regarding Iran's military
intervention in favor of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad and against the Syrian
people.
"The declared U.S. policy in
the region is part of the challenges facing Gulf security, rather than an
element strengthening [that security]. The same goes for the U.S.'s support for
the Al-Maliki government in Iraq, which perseveres in its pact of destiny with
Iran at the expense of Iraq's own unity and the security of Iraq's neighbors.
"If this is a new path in U.S.
policy, the price will be steep for the Gulf states, which will not wait until
their land and history become part of that price. If this [new path] stems from
weakness in American policy, the Gulf states must not pay the price for this
weakness. Even if the options [open to the Gulf states] to compensate for the
weakness of the American role [in the region] are few, they do exist, and they
are more than possible; these options include relinquishing the historic
alliance with the U.S. There are those who are urging this [approach], desiring
it for their own benefit and for the benefit of the Gulf states.
"President Obama's faith in
the nuclear negotiations with Iran cannot come at the price of handing over the
security of the Gulf to Iran. Iraq is a convincing example of what U.S.-Iran cooperation
will bring, and [at this time] the Gulf states still have the power to identify
threats to their security – and they still have the weapons, manpower, and
allies to defend it."
Bahraini
Columnist: The U.S. Administration Must Present Tangible Evidence Of A Change
In Its Policy
Bahraini columnist Sayed Zahra
wrote in the daily Akhbar Al-Khaleej that Obama must alleviate the Saudi
concerns by taking tangible steps to demonstrate a change in America's policy
regarding the points of controversy between the two countries. In an article
titled "Obama and Saudi Arabia," he wrote: "Naturally, Obama's
visit is very important for the U.S., for Saudi Arabia and for the Arab states
at large. As is well known, it takes place amid intense disagreements between
the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as well as many other Arab countries, and against a
backdrop of general Arab rancor over America's policy on many different issues.
The visit is important because it is expected to mark a decisive turning point,
either deepening the disagreement with the U.S. and the Arab fears, or
improving Saudi-U.S. relations...
"Everyone knows the nature of
the disagreements between the U.S. and many Arab countries, including Saudi
Arabia, and [the nature of their] reservations regarding America's policy in
the region. There is extensive disagreement over the general direction of
America's new policy towards Iran, [for] it looks like the U.S. means to sign a
comprehensive agreement with Iran at the expense of the Arab Gulf states. [They
also] have reservations regarding America's support of Al-Maliki's sectarian
regime in Iraq, which is subordinate to Iran, and regarding the U.S.
positions and policy towards Syria,
Egypt, Bahrain and the Palestinian problem... Some think that these U.S.
positions and policies [even] threaten the security and stability of the Arab
Gulf states and the other Arab countries. [In fact,] there is a general
assumption that the U.S. administration has turned its back on the Arabs and
has decided to form an alliance with their enemies...
"What Obama will hear from the
Saudi leaders will not be diplomatic statements or words of flattery. They will
surely express to him, openly and clearly, all their reservations and fears
regarding the American administration's
policy and their objection to this policy, and demand that he take a firm
position in addressing these reservations and fears.
"In his conversations and
public statements during the visit, Obama is expected to stress the depth of
the relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, as well as America's
commitment to the security and stability of the Arab Gulf states. He will also
speak of developing the relations [between the countries], etc. But the problem
is that these positions and views are worthless and meaningless, whether they
are stated publically or in secret, for American officials voice them constantly
while the American policy that is the source of the Saudi and Arab fears
remains unchanged.
"If Obama wants to
convincingly reassure the Saudi leaders, he must present definite practical
measures that the American administration [means to take] regarding the
controversial issues, as tangible evidence of an actual change in American
policy... In other words, theoretical assurances are worthless; the American
administration must present facts on the ground. Can Obama do this? We are
skeptical. In any case, we must wait and see what he suggests and what he
does."
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--DCH
