Steinmeier: Six Rules for Europe

The German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, spoke at the Ambassadors Conference in Paris on August 29, 2014. In preliminary remarks, he thanked his host, Laurent Fabius, and praised the durability of the Franco-German alliance. He then went on to enumerate six rules (or "hypotheses") for Europe. 

* * *

Excellencies, Europe is currently faced with issues which are key to its future. We have the European elections behind us, we’re saying good bye to one EU Commission and welcoming a new one which will have to tackle major challenges.So it makes sense for this panel to turn its attention to the big question: what direction should Europe take in the next five years?However, we all know that we can’t look at this major question on its own. For these issues come at a time when Europe faces an almost overwhelming number of threats: Ukraine and Russia, Gaza, Syria and the perilous situation in northern Iraq, to name just those crises which are taking up most of our attention at present.To use an image: we cannot get the good ship Europe out of the water to refurbish it in a shipyard. Rather, we have to secure Europe and make it seaworthy while out in the high seas and in the eye of the storm.If you were to ask Laurent and myself about Europe’s future today, then we would reply from the ship’s machine room with, as it were, our sleeves rolled up.From this practical perspective, I want today to outline – as succinctly as possible – six hypotheses about Europe and about the role of Germany and France.

My first hypothesis is that the way in which we respond to these crises will shape Europe for years to come. These responses will certainly not only shape Europe’s foreign policy but Europe as a whole, its position in the world and how it perceives itself.For we have long since known that if we – by that I mean Germany, France and its neighbours – want to protect ourselves and be a “force formatrice” in this world, we can only achieve it together.The current threats make that all the clearer. To date, we Europeans have taken a united stand and that’s only right: we’ve just made a joint decision to support the Kurds in northern Iraq against the murderous ISIS gangs.I believe that if we stick together and act intelligently then historians will one day look back and say: these foreign policy crises fostered integration in Europe’s foreign policy, just as the financial and monetary crisis fostered a more integrated European economic policy.

My second hypothesis is that the mark of European foreign policy isn’t identical interests but, rather, our absolute determination to ultimately stand together and take joint action.This determination to stand united is the heartbeat of the European Union. France and Germany have forged it – despite differing interests and despite the scars left by history.Europe’s determination to stand united is being especially tested by the Ukraine crisis. Naturally, European countries have very different historical relations with Russia. For some in the West, Russia is a fairly distant trading partner, but for many in the East, it remains in their memory as the country which oppressed them for decades. And for Germany – with its divided history – it’s a bit of both.Just a few weeks ago, I addressed the Ambassadors Conference of our friends in Poland. There I said that despite all the different experiences in Europe, we all – whether we be Poles, Germans or French – share the conviction that Europe’s peaceful order is our greatest achievement since the dark chapters of the 20th century. What’s more, we will defend it together – with pressure on the one hand and political offers on the other, just as we have done, and will continue to do, in close Franco‑German coordination in the Foreign Affairs Council, in the Weimar Triangle, in the “Normandy Four” group and in other initiatives.

My third thesis is that European foreign policy means a division of labour.This begins with a joint analysis but it includes taking pragmatic and joint action: whenever and wherever we can achieve something, always with the partners and resources that can help us do this.This division of labour doesn’t mean: to each his own and every man for himself!The idea is not: Germany understands Russia and France understands Africa, so Germany should deal with the East and France with the South. That’s not how it works!German foreign policy makers are aware that Africa is a neighbouring continent with huge opportunities, as well as very concrete threats. Whether Africa really is, as some suspect, the “Asia of the 21st century” in economic terms, isn’t clear yet. However, we know today that a new middle class in Africa is heading towards a better future, that in terms of population numbers alone, Africa is set to double its weight to two billion people by 2050. On the other hand, there’s a danger that fragile statehood, radical Islamism and conflicts over scarce resources will ignite new crises and flows of refugees. Europe cannot be indifferent to this.That’s why we have a joint, a European strategic interest in Africa and we have to pursue it together – each country with its own approach and its own strengths.Despite all of this, the differences between Germany, France and the other European partners don’t represent a weakness. On the contrary, if we put our specific capabilities, traditions, tools and channels of communication to use, then these differences will be transformed into a strength. Then European foreign policy will be more than the sum of many small parts.

My fourth hypothesis is that European foreign policy needs all 28.In the debate inflamed by populist forces, people are too quick to ask: can’t there be a Europe without Britain?My response is: can there be a European foreign policy without Britain? Definitely not!Take the Gaza conflict, for example. The E3 – France, Germany and Britain – have put concrete proposals for Europe’s contribution to peace on the table. The E3 play a crucial role in the negotiations with Iran on its nuclear programme. And, not least, Britain is crucial to an alliance which continues to be Europe’s most important: the alliance across the Atlantic.

My fifth hypothesis is that Europe’s foreign policy needs the entire toolbox of diplomacy.I asked at the start of my second term of office as German Foreign Minister: what responsibilities does German foreign policy have, are we setting the right priorities, are we acting quickly enough and what instruments do we have in our toolbox?We can ask similar questions about Europe: are we really using all the instruments in the toolbox, from the long‑term stabilisation of economies and the rule of law to acute crisis management? Are we quick enough?Are we using our resources in an optimal manner?In the Review 2014 process I launched within the Federal Foreign Office, we’ve taken a conscious decision to look beyond Germany and are seeking inspiration from our friends and partners in order to find the answers to these questions.Naturally, we’re also looking to France. For France has long since been a consummate player in the diplomatic arena: bilaterally, in a regional context and at a global level, as France’s active role in the United Nations shows.You manage time and again, Laurent, to adapt your toolbox in keeping with the times.On the one hand, that applies to issues as, for example, illustrated by the intensive manner in which you have dealt with the major questions of the future – energy and the climate – here in the Quai, quite concretely the 2015 climate summit, in the preparation of which we want to cooperate closely. Or the importance which you attach to the promotion of foreign trade and investment, economic diplomacy.On the other hand, it applies to processes – including more technical things, such as diplomatic telegrams. Le Monde has called your new information system a “Facebook for diplomats”. If you will allow me to remain with this image, I would press the “like” button in recognition of this courage to adopt new practices.

For my sixth and last hypothesis, I want to look inwards from the outside.If we foreign policy makers call for Europe to play a greater role in the world, then we also have to look inside Europe itself. Which is to say, Europe needs an internal structure that allows it to take action externally. Firstly, this means that we need the highest possible degree of European coordination in all the major issues we face at international level: from climate and energy policy to data protection and rules for the Internet. If we can’t formulate common European approaches to these issues, then we have no chance of doing so at global level.However, I’m talking about more than issues:Europe’s internal structure needs to preserve everything that makes Europe a strong player in the international arena. What makes Europe attractive in people’s eyes?I believe it’s the unique European model which combines both freedom and cohesion, the market economy and the welfare state, competitiveness and social justice. These are the two sides of the European coin.Managing to strike this balance time and again is the main challenge not only for individual governments – most certainly for the French Government in these turbulent times – but also for the next EU Commission.

So far, so good. I know that six hypotheses are one more than the ideal essay comprises, or at least that’s what is taught at the ENA ... Perhaps we can get rid of one in the course of our discussion. I’m looking forward to the debate with you!

* * *

Speech by Foreign Minister Steinmeier at the Ambassadors Conference in Paris, Federal Foreign Office, August 29, 2014

West to Libya: We're Concerned

Five western powers released a statement on August 13, 2014, condemning the civil conflict in Libya. As appears from the statement, being powerful means never having to say you’re sorry.

* * *

The Governments of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States strongly condemn the ongoing fighting and violence in and around Tripoli, Benghazi, and across Libya. We are in particular deeply concerned by the increasing toll the violence is taking on Libya’s civilian population and institutions, as well as the threat it poses to Libya’s democratic transition. We deplore the rise in the number of civilian casualties and express deep concern about the shortages in medical supplies, the displacement of thousands of families, the destruction of residences and infrastructure, as well as the halt in economic activity. We are deeply concerned about attacks carried out against the civilian population and civilian targets in Tripoli and Benghazi that may amount to breaches of international humanitarian law. These violations must stop and those responsible must be held accountable.

Violence cannot and must not be a means to achieve political goals or settle ideological differences. Only through political dialogue, inclusiveness, and consensus can Libyans move the country beyond the current crisis and build the free, prosperous, democratic, and secure state for which they have sacrificed so much.

We therefore reiterate the repeated calls by the international community, as well as the Libyan interim government and House of Representatives, for an immediate ceasefire and for all parties to this conflict to begin a peaceful political dialogue, and for them to recognize the authority of the elected representatives of the Libyan people. We remain in constant contact with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and strongly support its efforts to achieve an immediate ceasefire and to end the bloodshed. We urge all sides to respond positively and without delay.

The Governments of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States continue to stand firmly behind the Libyan people, and will partner with Libya until the hopes and aspirations of the Libyan people are achieved.

* * *

Joint Statement on Libya by the Governments of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Office of the Spokesperson, August 13, 2014

Gauck at Munich: Germany's Role

German President Joachim Gauck gave the opening address to the 50th Munich Security Conference, held January 31, 2014.  His remarks were recently hailed by one observer as "a momentous speech that went to the very core of Germany's deeply engrained reluctance to embrace military power as a means to engage in international affairs." 

* * *

. . . This milestone anniversary provides an opportunity to look back and, above all, to look ahead. I’d therefore like to talk today about the path Germany has taken and where it could lead in future. For we Germans are advancing towards a form of responsibility that has not yet become routine for us.

In a nutshell, I’d like to talk about Germany’s role in the world.

Let me start by saying that this is a good Germany, the best we’ve ever known. And that’s not mere rhetoric. When I was born, the National Socialists – who brought war and suffering to the world – were in power. When the Second World War ended, I was a young boy, only five years old. Our country was in ruins, both materially and morally. Just look at where Germany stands today: it’s a stable democracy, free and peace-loving, prosperous and open. It champions human rights. It’s a reliable partner in Europe and the world: an equal partner with equal responsibilities. All of that fills me with gratitude and joy.

However, it’s precisely because these are good times for Germany that we have to consider what we have to change today to protect what is important to us. Some people in Germany are asking what there is to think about. They say that our country is surrounded by friends and that no country is seeking to become our enemy. They believe that Germany’s foreign policy has long since found the right formula. That there is not much to adjust, never mind change. Why fix something if it isn’t broken?

It’s undoubtedly true that Germany’s foreign policy has solid roots. Its most important achievement is that Germany, with the help of its partners, has turned a past blighted by war and dominance into a present marked by peace and cooperation. This includes the reconciliation with our neighbours, our commitment to European integration as a national goal, as well as our partnership with the United States as the cornerstone of the North Atlantic Alliance. Germany advocates a security concept which is based on values and encompasses respect for human rights. In Germany’s foreign policy vocabulary, free trade and peace go hand in hand. As do the exchange of goods and prosperity.

Germany is globalised more than most countries and thus benefits more than most from an open world order. A world order which allows Germany to reconcile interests with fundamental values. Germany derives its most important foreign policy goal in the 21st century from all of this: preserving this order and system and making them fit for the future.

Pursuing this core interest while the world around us is undergoing sweeping changes is one of the major challenges of our age. If there has been one constant factor during the last few years, then it’s the fact that we always underestimate the speed of change. Futurologists are amazed time and again that changes in the world become reality much more quickly than they had forecast. That also has an impact on our security: at a faster pace than we had ever imagined, we are entering a world in which individuals can buy a quantity of destructive power which was the preserve of states in earlier times. A world in which economic and political power is shifting and entire regions are arming themselves. In the Middle East, there is a danger that individual crises will converge and engulf the whole region. At this very moment, the world’s only superpower is reconsidering the scale and form of its global engagement. Europe, its partner, is busy navel-gazing. I don’t believe that Germany can simply carry on as before in the face of these developments.

For some time now, it’s been impossible to ignore the fact that this change is gradually gnawing away at German certainties. We’re committed to the European idea. However, Europe’s crisis has made us feel uncertain. We’re also committed to NATO. However, we’ve been debating for years about the direction the Alliance should take, and we’ve done nothing to stop the depletion of its financial resources. We’re not calling the alliance with the United States into question, but we have observed symptoms of stress and uncertainty about the future. We have great respect for the rules-based world of the United Nations. However, we can’t ignore the crisis in multilateralism. We’d like to see the new players on the world stage participate in the global order. However, some of them are seeking a place on the margins rather than at the heart of the system. We feel surrounded by friends, but hardly know how to deal with diffuse security threats such as the privatisation of power by terrorists and cyber criminals. We rightly complain when allies overstep the mark when they use electronic surveillance to detect threats. And yet, we prefer to remain reliant on them and hesitate to improve our own surveillance capacities.

This means that simply repeating familiar mantras won’t be enough in future! For the key question is: has Germany already adequately recognised the new threats and the changes in the structure of the international order? Has is reacted commensurate with its weight? Has Germany shown enough initiative to ensure the future viability of the network of norms, friends and alliances which has brought us peace in freedom and democracy in prosperity?

Some – both at home and abroad – have a quick and simplistic answer: they regard Germany as the shirker in the international community. They say that Germany is all too ready to duck difficult issues. 

First of all, this criticism can be countered with facts and a pinch of historical perspective.

After the Second World War, initially no-one – neither abroad nor within Germany – wanted our country to play a strong international role. Furthermore, there were two German states which were both, to differing extents, only partially sovereign. Since reunification, Germany has embarked upon a new course. Step by step, our country has transformed itself from a beneficiary to a guarantor of international security and order. First of all, I want to mention development cooperation. Germany is investing large sums in this sphere because it wants to help build stable and secure societies. Second, Germany is doing much to lead the world into a resource-efficient future. And third, few other countries are doing more to promote international institutions. Fourth, Germany has on occasion participated in military missions. Fifth, what the Federal Republic has done to help Europe grow together and overcome the recent crisis is truly impressive.

These are the facts. And yet not all critics of German policy are quite simply unfair. Some differentiate and highlight subtle nuances, and such criticism has a core of truth. Germany has already been travelling along the road towards becoming a guarantor of the international order and security for 24 years now. It’s a difficult walk along a winding road. However, those who believe that very small steps are the best will find it difficult to keep up with the rapid change in threats and the dramatic shifts in the strategic environment.

Let me ask a few leading questions. Are we doing what we can to stabilise our neighbourhood, both in the East and in Africa? Are we doing what we have to in order to counter the threat of terrorism? And, in cases where we have found convincing reasons to join our allies in taking even military action, are we willing to bear our fair share of the risks? Are we doing what we should to attract new and reinvigorated major powers to the cause of creating a just world order for tomorrow? Do we even evince the interest in some parts of the world which is their due, given their importance? What role do we want to play in the crises afflicting distant parts of the globe? Are we playing an active enough role in that field in which the Federal Republic of Germany has developed such expertise? I am speaking, of course, of conflict prevention. In my opinion, Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.

Germany has long since demonstrated that it acts in an internationally responsible way. But it could – building on its experience in safeguarding human rights and the rule of law – take more resolute steps to preserve and help shape the order based on the European Union, NATO and the United Nations. At the same time, Germany must also be ready to do more to guarantee the security that others have provided it with for decades.

Now, some people in my country consider "international responsibility" to be a euphemism, veiling what’s really at stake. Some think that in reality Germany would have to pay more. Others think that Germany would have to send in more soldiers. And they are all convinced that "more responsibility" primarily means more trouble. You will not be surprised to hear that I see things differently.

Politicians always have to take responsibility for their actions. But they also have to live with the consequences of their omissions. He who fails to act bears responsibility, too. We would be deceiving ourselves if we were to believe that Germany was an island and thus protected from the vicissitudes of our age. For few other countries have such close links with the rest of the world as Germany does. Germany has thus benefited especially from the open global order. And it’s vulnerable to any disruptions to the system. For this reason, the consequences of inaction can be just as serious, if not worse than the consequences of taking action.

In this context, I would like to repeat what I said on 3 October, the Day of German Unity. We cannot hope to be spared from the conflicts of this world. But if we contribute to solving them, we can take a hand at least in shaping the future. It is thus worth Germany’s while to invest properly in European cooperation and the global order.

Of course, it’s true that solving problems can cost money. But we have shown, in the European crisis and elsewhere, that we are willing to go to great lengths to fulfil Alliance commitments and provide support, because doing so is ultimately in our own interest.

Sometimes it can even be necessary to send in the troops. If there’s one thing we’ve learned from Afghanistan, it’s that the Bundeswehr mission was necessary, but it could never have been more than a single element in the overall strategy. Germany will never support any purely military solution, but will approach issues with political judiciousness and explore all possible diplomatic options. However, when the last resort – sending in the Bundeswehr – comes to be discussed, Germany should not say "no" on principle. Nor should it say "yes" unthinkingly.

I have to admit that while there are genuine pacifists in Germany, there are also people who use Germany’s guilt for its past as a shield for laziness or a desire to disengage from the world. In the words of the historian Heinrich August Winkler, this is an attitude that grants Germany a questionable "right to look the other way, which other Western democracies" cannot claim for themselves. Restraint can thus be taken too far if people start making special rules for themselves. Whenever that happens, I will criticise it. For it is crystal clear to me that we need NATO. And it is precisely at times when the United States cannot keep on providing more and more that Germany and its European partners must themselves assume greater responsibility for their security.

Furthermore, it should today be natural for Germany and its allies to not simply refuse to help others when human rights violations multiply and result in genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. Not only do all Western democracies consider respect for human rights to be one of their defining features, it is also a cornerstone of any guarantee of security, of a peaceful and cooperative world order.

Brutal regimes must not be allowed to hide behind the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. This is where the concept of "responsibility to protect" comes to bear. This concept transfers to the international community the responsibility to protect the people of a given country from such atrocities when their own government fails to do so. In the very last resort, military means can be used, after careful consideration and a weighing up of the consequences, upon authorisation by the UN Security Council.

I know, and like human rights defenders around the world I am pained by the fact that action is not taken everywhere where such intervention would be morally justified and necessary to protect the life and limb of people in danger. This dilemma has recently been highlighted again by events in Syria. And I know that the relationship between legality and legitimacy will continue to be awkward as long as the Security Council is so often divided on these issues.

There will be many reasons why the concept of responsibility to protect rarely results in an intervention. The consequences of such action are frequently difficult or even impossible to calculate, and there is no way of determining accurately enough whether the situation in the crisis area will be better after military intervention. Sometimes domestic policy considerations will also militate against action. Whatever the precise circumstances, the decision whether to intervene or not will always be a morally difficult one.

The UN General Assembly has in principle recognised the concept of responsibility to protect. However, the concept remains contentious; the international debate continues. That’s a good thing, since potential abuse of the concept for expansionist or imperialist purposes has to be ruled out. I therefore welcome the fact that the German Government is helping to further develop the concept, with a focus on prevention, international cooperation and the development of early warning systems.

So, will Germany reap "more trouble" if it plays a more active role? There are indeed commentators who think that a Germany that shows initiative will inevitably experience friction with its friends and neighbours. This assumption is, in my opinion, based on a misconception. "More responsibility" does not mean "more throwing our weight around". Nor does it mean "more going it alone"! On the contrary, by cooperating with other countries, particularly within the European Union, Germany gains influence. 

Germany would in fact benefit from even more cooperation. Perhaps this could even lead to the establishment of a common European defence. In our interconnected world, there are problems that no country can solve on its own, however powerful it may be. The ability and willingness to cooperate are becoming the defining trademark of international politics. In line with this, responsibility is always shared responsibility.

As a globally plugged-in economy, Germany has no alternative but to find partners, be considerate and make compromises. Germany has long known that it must guard against going its own special way. A democracy must, of course, have the right to remain on the sidelines on occasion. But such a step should be well considered and should remain the exception. Going it alone has its price.

Of course, if you act, you are open to criticism. We saw that during the European crisis when Germany took the initiative. Old resentments were quick to surface, both within and outside Germany. I dread to think of the wave of outrage that would have been sparked had Germany not taken action at that time of European need.

I am most firmly convinced that a Germany which reaches out more to the world will be an even better friend and ally. It will also be a yet better partner within Europe.

To find its proper course in these difficult times, Germany needs resources, above all intellectual resources. It needs minds, institutions and forums. A Security Conference once a year in Munich – that’s to be welcomed, but it’s not enough. I wonder if it isn’t time for all the universities to mobilise more than a handful of chairs where German foreign policy can be analysed. Doesn’t research on security issues need to be invigorated, to boost work on matters such as defence against cyber attacks by criminals or intelligence services?

It’s not a good sign that younger members of the German Bundestag feel that focusing on foreign and security policy is not beneficial to their careers. By the way, the German Bundestag has held some 240 debates on overseas deployments of the Bundeswehr since 1994. These debates have been conducted in an exemplary manner. However, in the same period, parliament has held fewer than ten fundamental debates on German foreign and security policy. But we need such debates – in the Bundestag and everywhere: in the churches and trade unions, in the Bundeswehr, in the political parties and in all kinds of associations.

For foreign and security policy is not just a matter for the elite. Basic existential issues should be a matter for reflection in the heart of society. Matters that affect everyone should be discussed by everyone. International events keep pushing us towards such a debate – the latest examples being the events in Mali and the Central African Republic. The fact that Germany’s new Foreign Minister wants to re-examine his Ministry’s policies – and put them up for discussion – squares nicely with the aspiration to open this debate. Frank-Walter Steinmeier wants to seek dialogue with academia and with civil society. This would be a step towards a new understanding of society by society. Talking about how, where and when we should seek to defend our values and our security will gradually give us greater clarity about the extent and aims of Germany’s international involvement.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the foreign guests at the Munich Security Conference for the trust their countries placed in West Germany at a time when many of their contemporaries still considered it a gamble.

However, to conclude, I would like to request something of us Germans. I would like to request that, as a basic rule, we too place our trust in this fundamentally reformed country of ours.

The post-war generations had reasons to be distrustful – of the German state and of German society. But the time for such categorical distrust is past. Let me come back now to my initial remarks. The Federal Republic of Germany has lived in peace with all its neighbours for more than six decades. Civil and human rights have been upheld for six decades. The rule of law has prevailed for six decades. Prosperity and internal security are among the country’s defining features. Germany is home to a vibrant civil society which identifies errors and can help to correct them.

There has never been an era like this in the history of our nation. This is also why we are now permitted to have confidence in our abilities and should trust in ourselves. For we know that people who trust in themselves gain the strength to reach out to the world. People who trust in themselves can be relied on by their partners.

In the past, when the Germans put their country above everything, "über alles", as the national anthem proclaimed, a form of nationalism evolved that progressed through all the phases of an unenlightened sense of national identity, from forced self-assurance to self-delusion to hubris. Our affirmation of our nation today is based on all the things that make this country credible and trustworthy – including its commitment to cooperation with our European and North Atlantic friends. We should not trust in ourselves because we are the German nation, but because we are this German nation.

Let us thus not turn a blind eye, not run from threats, but instead stand firm, not forget, neglect or betray universal values, but instead uphold these values together with our friends and partners. Let us be seen to be living by them, let us defend them.

* * *

Speech to open 50th Munich Security conference, January 31, 2014,  Website of Federal President Joachin Gauck. 

Steinmeier on Ukraine

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier's recent intervention in the Ukraine debate, calling for a revived Geneva process, is here defended in a May 7 address to the German Bundestag. 

I would note two serious inadequacies of the German position. Though calling for a return to the April 17 agreement stipulating the withdrawal from illegally seized buildings, Steinmeier does not address the utterly contrasting interpretations given of this agreement by Western and Russian authorities. The latter insists it applies all over the country, the former only in the South and East.

Steinmeier also says nothing about restraining the efforts of the Kiev authorities to "annihilate" the "terrorists" who have seized public buildings in Ukraine's East (and to raise up a national guard formed of Euromaidan veterans, presumably including Right Sector and Svoboda elements, to be the spear carriers of this dubious enterprise). If the West intends to support such measures, the hope for a peaceful resolution radically diminishes, yet there is no official German dissent from the US position that  Ukraine's response to the seizure of public buildings in the East has been proportionate. Just blowing up the buildings in which insurgents are housed does not look like a winning political strategy; in fact, it is fraught with danger and clearly incompatible with calls to resolve the crisis through negotiation. If Germany wishes to play a mediating role--there is no one else--it needs to step up more forcefully and specify the terms of a de-escalation. It doesn't help to simply reiterate ambiguous formulas. 

This transcript is from the Federal Foreign Office, May 7, 2014

* * *

To put it in a nutshell, the situation in eastern and southern Ukraine is terrible. Watching the news, we all witnessed the occupations of buildings, above all in Odessa last Friday, when at least 40 people died in a building after two groups had fled violence on the street. There were again brutal clashes between Ukrainian security forces and pro‑Russian separatists yesterday and in all likelihood there have been more over the course of today. People have been injured and have even died in Donetsk, Slavyansk and Odessa. There are Russian soldiers at the border with Ukraine and quite naturally many people are afraid that they could cross it at any time.

The reports we are receiving are alarming. These days we are all aware that the news is not only becoming ever worse, but it is worsening at an ever quicker pace. And to fan the flames further – the more dramatic the events are, the harsher the public rhetoric becomes. And although I am aware that what many of those involved are shouting out on political platforms often sounds much more pragmatic in the diplomatic sphere, action and rhetorical reaction are spiralling into a vicious circle. 

At some point we will reach the point of no return. Then on our continent, we really will be on the brink of a confrontation which for the last 25 years, since the end of the Cold War, we have deemed impossible.

I am not painting a gloomy picture of the situation, I am painting an accurate one. I am not doing so to spread fear but because here in Germany we must show that we are prepared to use all of the, not endless, options open to us to stand in the way of further escalation, and I really mean it: all diplomatic means to keep on forging ways out. I am convinced that it is not too late yet, reason can still gain the upper hand, but it can only do so if all those involved, above all those in Moscow and Kyiv, are prepared to resume the quest for a political solution. This is what we are struggling for every day.

(Applause from the SPD, the CDU/CSU and ALLIANCE 90/THE GREENS)

And I know, we do not have much time left. The presidential elections in Ukraine are scheduled for 25 May. And because there is not much time left, last Friday I met with the current Chair of the OSCE, Didier Burkhalter, in Switzerland in the morning and invited Catherine Ashton to Berlin at midday, and yesterday I flew to Vienna to meet the Ukrainian Foreign Minister and in the end also Sergey Lavrov, to start to prepare what I consider to be urgently necessary in the current situation and what I described in five short points in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung yesterday:

Firstly, I think that we need the four main powers who have already met in Geneva – Ukraine, Russia, the EU and the United States – to meet again. This is not because Geneva I failed but because nothing followed it to provide details of exactly how to implement the intelligent political agreement, step by step, in practice.

Secondly, we need to reach an understanding, and I mean an understanding with Russia too, that the elections scheduled for 25 May in Ukraine will indeed take place.

(Applause from the SPD, the CDU/CSU and ALLIANCE 90/THE GREENS)

Yesterday I used all of my powers of persuasion to reiterate to my Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, that it is precisely they, who themselves question the legitimacy of the current leadership in Ukraine, who should have the greatest interest in the top position within the political leadership being newly elected now. The question of parliamentary elections and the election of a new government can then be considered over the course of the year, but the presidential elections on 25 May should and must be the start of this process.

Thirdly, I believe that in order to properly hold the elections on 25 May, it is absolutely vital that by then we have initiated what has been lacking to date, namely a national dialogue. There are many plans to do this, but these plans must now be put into action. This can be done by convening conferences of mayors. This can be done by convening conferences of governors, with participants from all parts of Ukraine. This can be done, as has proven useful in other European countries in times of upheaval, by holding round table discussions, in this case with the participation of eastern and southern Ukraine and, where necessary, mediated by the OSCE.

Fourthly, we need to launch a process of constitutional reform in which all regions of the country feel properly represented within the institutions debating it.

Fifthly, we need a process which outlines steps to achieve the disarmament of all illegal groups and the clearance of public spaces and public buildings.

We need to agree on these five clear points and outline steps for their implementation. This can be done using the Geneva Statement of 17 April as a starting point. From the discussions which I have had about this, I have seen that no one actually rejects the idea of another Geneva meeting. However, before the next meeting, on concrete implementation steps, we cannot allow the bar to be raised further every day. What we need now is for the four participants to be able and willing to overcome the current hurdles, and this is what we are working on.

I know that diplomacy always advances too slowly, in baby steps. Of course I am aware that every occupation of a public building and every violent clash knocks us further back. But despite all disappointment, which I share, if we are knocked back by acts of violence, we must strive to bounce back and to continue pushing forward. This is why I have written that above all in this situation, giving up is not and cannot be an option.

(Applause from the SPD, the CDU/CSU and ALLIANCE 90/THE GREENS)

Now I know that all over the world, and in Europe too, voices continue to express different expectations of foreign policy. This is mirrored in the criticism that we are apparently not determined enough, that we should show more resolution, strength and more force in our foreign policy. One could say that. Except that you have to be very clear about what the alternative is. And what exactly would it be, beyond diplomatic pressure? Anyone who really wants to show this alleged strength must be prepared to do something which I am not prepared to do, namely to countenance the idea of using force in such a situation. I know that the majority of this house agrees with me that a military solution would not lead to a settlement but rather to a huge catastrophe.

(Applause from the SPD, the CDU/CSU, DIE LINKE and ALLIANCE 90/THE GREENS)

This is why I am saying and writing –

(MP Christine Buchholz (DIE LINKE) shouts out) –

wherever I can – even in the face of your criticism – that this talk of strength is not what counts here. It is not strength or weakness that determines such situations but good sense. At the end of the day, foreign policy which only thinks in terms of the strong and the weak only aims to produce but winners and losers. Wise foreign policy, and this is what we need in the current situation, thinks ahead to conflict resolution. Wise foreign policy, therefore, knows that we must avoid automatic reactions, that we must avoid an escalation which would ultimately produce nothing but losers. . . .

* * *

 

Steinmeier on Ukraine and Germany's Role

German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier in an interview with Die Zeit, published April 16, 2014: 

* * *

Minister, Europe is experiencing its most dangerous crisis since the end of the Cold War. Has the conflict in Ukraine caught you on the wrong foot?

It seemed out of the question that more than seven decades after the end of the Second World War we would be confronted within just a few weeks with a policy in which force is used to redraw borders. That must not set a precedent, either in Europe or anywhere else in the world.

Why were you so surprised by this crisis?

Relations between the EU and Russia have experienced highs and lows during the last 15 years. However, after years of growing economic cooperation with Russia and political cooperation which has not always been conflict‑free but has been constant, I didn’t reckon with a return to the old patterns where geopolitical spaces are secured with military force.

Putin has annexed Crimea. Has force triumphed over law?

That’s undoubtedly the case in Crimea. Russia’s actions are politically unacceptable and a violation of international law. Now we have to ensure that Russia’s conduct and its consequences don’t have a lasting influence on relations among Europe’s states.

To date, the sanctions imposed by the West have been symbolic rather than anything else. Will the annexation remain without consequences?

But there have already been consequences. No‑one in Europe believes that we could simply return to business as usual in our dealings with Russia following the annexation of Crimea. Nor can Russia convince itself that the annexation has been without consequences. In economic terms, it has led to a slump in Moscow’s financial markets, the rouble’s fall in value and a dramatically accelerating capital flight. In political terms, the fact that it was clear from the votes in both the Security Council and the UN General Assembly that Russia’s policy is not even supported by many countries which normally align themselves with Moscow should make it stop to think.

Has Europe acted decisively enough?

I believe Europe’s policy is the right one. Firstly, because we have adopted a clear joint stance. And secondly, because we’ve reacted intelligently rather than rashly to Russia’s actions. Our three-phase sanctions leave the door open to tougher action and ensure that there are no obstacles in the way of a return to talks with Russia.

The Americans would have liked to proceed more quickly and further with the sanctions. Why are you and the German Government putting on the brakes?

What actually happened was that in the end the Americans supported the European proposal of phased action and have continued along this path themselves. I know from countless meetings and telephone conversations that John Kerry and I take the same view of the situation.

But why didn’t you call for tougher sanctions?

We made our firm stance clear to Russia and reinforced this with sanctions. However, this is not about issuing rival public statements and falling in with the media’s expectations. Rather, it’s about keeping our options open – in both directions, by the way – in the face of the escalation. That’s what’s behind our strategy. The negotiations on a contact group consisting of representatives from Ukraine, Russia, the EU and the US will show whether it has the desired effect. Russia can be in no doubt that it will have to reckon with a strong reaction if it wants to go beyond Crimea.

Germany is not part of the contact group which is meeting for the first time in Geneva this Thursday. Is Berlin losing influence?

No. I myself proposed that the contact group should not be made up of individual European states but that we should create an entity which is as small as possible, works behind closed doors and doesn’t have the appearance of a press conference at its very first meeting. That’s why I advocated that Europe be represented by Catherine Ashton. I wrote a letter to Secretary of State Kerry explaining this.

Are you concerned that Russia will also intervene in eastern Ukraine?

That would be a serious mistake. By the way, I don’t believe that Russia is following a master plan with a prepared script. There are many indications to suggest that Russia is playing things by ear. Moscow is also driven by the jingoism which has been whipped up by the Russian leadership itself. The deployment of Russian troops along the border with Ukraine is alarming, as are the images from eastern Ukraine. That’s why it’s so important that we have OSCE observers in Ukraine. The number of observers hasn’t yet reached the target, but we are already receiving a lot more information on the situation on the ground.

There has now been gunfire in eastern Ukraine, there have been fatalities. Public buildings have also been occupied.

The occupation of public buildings by violent and, in some cases, armed pro-Russian demonstrators is making the situation in eastern and southern Ukraine even more dangerous. Confrontations such as the one in Slavyansk, where people are said to have died or been injured, have huge potential for escalation. However, what we’ve seen there so far is not a collapse of state authority. And there are people with influence seeking to defuse the situation. It would be good if Russia would distance itself from the violent and illegal actions of pro‑Russian demonstrators. At any rate, the risk of a political division in Ukraine has not yet been banished.

Could Russia also intervene in Moldova?

We’ve made it clear to Russia that any activities beyond Crimea in eastern or southern Ukraine or in Moldova would be regarded by us as Moscow taking things to a new level, and that this would trigger the third phase of sanctions.

Some in the West are saying that Ukraine can only be protected effectively if it joins NATO.

Those who say that should first of all take a look at Ukraine. I know the country’s political leaders from many encounters and talks and therefore know that they have very different concerns and little interest in making the NATO issue, which is highly controversial in Ukraine, the subject of political debate. To be quite honest, I share the view of the US President; I don’t believe Ukraine is heading for NATO membership.

Wouldn’t it be better to leave the Russians in the dark about that? After all, they don’t always tell us what’s not open to question for them.

Well, journalists are free to not ask questions. When you ask me a question, I answer as I think fit.

NATO expanded eastwards even though it was aware of Russian sensibilities. Was that the right way forward?

Looking back with hypothetical assumptions, going into the “what ifs”, is of no use to anyone. There were and indeed still are sensibilities – especially in the case of Russia. But what matters most is that many Eastern European states which had been part of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact wanted to join the Alliance. It was right not to deny them this protection. Unfortunately, it wasn’t possible to discuss the different interests and expectations frankly and sincerely in the NATO-Russia Council. Whenever I was there, we didn’t get past the rituals of protocol. That was a mistake.

What is the deciding factor when it comes to NATO accession? That the majority of the population are in favour?

NATO is an open alliance with clear criteria. That means a commitment to shared values and the readiness to pursue a joint line. Of course, the views of the people in any country which wants to join play a very important role, but so does the overall political situation.

Should the EU hold out the prospect of membership to Ukraine?

Ukraine has now signed the political section of the Association Agreement. It’s thus now a partner within the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy. When the Neighbourhood Policy was drawn up in the middle of the last decade, incidentally based on the experiences with the Orange Revolution, the idea was that we needed a separate European instrument for countries which were not prospective member states. It was meant to be an alternative to, not preparation for membership. But, of course, the EU has never been a closed shop, nor will it become one in future – provided the EU retains its capacity to absorb new members.

So association isn’t the last step?

Ukraine hasn’t even signed the entire Association Agreement yet. The most important task now is to safeguard Ukraine’s national unity and provide it with every possible support to ensure its political and economic stability.

The EU wants to provide Ukraine with financial support. Isn’t there a danger that EU aid will be passed on directly to Gazprom?

It’s true that Russia holds all the cards and can make Ukraine’s life difficult, perhaps even impossible. But if Moscow would analyse the situation rationally, it would realise that it has most to lose from a collapsed state on its western border. That’s why we’re seeking a dialogue with Russia.

What’s going on in Putin’s head? Is he a nationalist or simply a power politician who pounces when he has the opportunity?

Putin knows how to use power and is prepared to be tough – both at home and abroad. But even Putin’s critics in Moscow argue that he has felt misunderstood by the West time and again.

Are his reactions therefore understandable?

I’m one of those who want more cooperation and less confrontation. I think there is no justification for using force to redraw borders, thereby opening a Pandora’s box with unforeseeable consequences. The erosion of the principle of territorial integrity in favour of a supposed right to self‑determination for ethnic groups could ultimately pose the greatest threat to Russia itself as a multi‑ethnic state. Opposing foreign policy philosophies are clashing with full force and preventing us from reaching out to each other: on the one hand we have the geopolitical thinking prevalent in the 19th century, focusing on spheres of influence, while here in Europe we have largely overcome nationalist thinking and have voluntarily relinquished some of our sovereignty in favour of European integration.

Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union the “greatest disaster of the 20th century”. Doesn’t he accept the course of history?

There are many indications that he doesn’t believe Russia has been treated with sufficient respect, either politically or economically.

Are you disappointed by your counterpart Sergey Lavrov, who didn’t react to all of your proposals on resolving the Ukraine crisis?

Disappointment has no role to play in foreign policy. Agreement has already been reached on the OSCE observer mission, and if the Ukraine quartet consisting of Russia, Ukraine, the US and Europe now comes about then my proposals haven’t been that bad. But it’s true to say that I’m disillusioned that 25 years after the end of the Cold War Europe is still unable to deal differently with unavoidable conflicts of interest.

Has your policy of cooperation with Russia failed?

I don’t know why some people are so keen to see cooperative political models fail. Confrontation and self‑isolation are not the way forward and they won’t solve anything. That’s why I can’t understand why some are secretly rubbing their hands in glee. The crisis is serious and the risk of a new division forming in Europe is far from over. I can only warn everyone not to throw the experiences from our history overboard. We have to remain level‑headed when others lose control of themselves.

Has Putin unwittingly done NATO a favour by annexing part of Ukraine, thus ridding it of the identity crisis it suffered during the last few years?

He hasn’t done NATO a favour. But he’s helped us Europeans to re‑discover the significance of foreign and security policy. The current crisis shows that our seemingly viable security architecture built up over decades must be constantly bolstered and renewed. That requires an active foreign policy. The Crimea crisis is therefore not an employment creation measure for NATO. But NATO, too, has to look at itself and ascertain whether it has set the right priorities.

Does that mean an “as you were” and a return to traditional national defence in Europe after the discussions on global military operations?

The mission in Afghanistan after 9/11 wasn’t prompted by our desire to bestow our ideas of democracy, freedom and security on people all over the world. It was launched at a time in which more than 3000 Americans had been killed in an Islamist attack and Europe feared that similar attacks could take place here. And attacks really did take place in London and Madrid. We wanted to prevent people in our country coming to harm as a result of the further expansion of training camps for terrorists in Afghanistan. It was about the security of Germany and its Alliance partners.

Germany spends 1.4 per cent of its economic output on defence. The NATO target is two per cent. Do we have to do more?

Most NATO member states fall far short of this self‑imposed target, including us. As we have to continue consolidating our finances, we can’t fool ourselves: no pot of gold will miraculously appear to enable us to immediately increase our spending to two per cent. We have to become more efficient and agree on a greater division of labour, just like the one in the sphere of air transport, which has been quite a success in NATO.

Your predecessor favoured a “culture of restraint”. You yourself say that it isn’t possible to comment on world events “from the sidelines”. What has to change in Germany’s foreign policy in concrete terms?

I’ve nothing against a culture of restraint when it comes to military action. All the parties in the German Bundestag share that view. However, it seems to me that constantly repeating this principle has allowed the misunderstanding to arise that we have to be restrained not only in military terms but also in foreign policy. I believe that’s wrong. We’re a bit too big and also too important within the international community to merely observe the game from the sidelines and make clever comments. Our partners expect more of us than we can deliver. But we have to be more active in those areas where we can live up their expectations. That’s why I decided just after taking up office that we would play an active role in the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and in securing arms stockpiles in Libya. And the attempt undertaken together with Laurent Fabius and Radek Sikorski to end the bloodshed in Kyiv is also part of this.

Germany’s allies have appealed to Berlin time and again to do more in military terms. Will you now give in to this pressure?

Anyone who believes that greater responsibility in foreign policy means more military missions is very much mistaken. I see no cause for such a debate. The facts tell a different story: we’ll be bringing 3000 troops home from Afghanistan before the end of 2014. Of the remaining missions in which we’re taking part, the KFOR mission in the Balkans is by far the biggest. Far fewer troops participate in other mandates, especially in Africa. Our focus is very much on training. I don’t see any kind of militarisation in that. . . .

* * *

The interviewers were Matthias Naß and Michael Thumann. The piece originally appeared in Die Zeit and was republished by the Federal Foreign Ministry, April 16, 2014.

Steinmeier: Rwanda's Lessons

On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide, April 4, 2014, German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier addressed the German Bundestag. Steinmeier is one of the most eloquent and insightful of today's crop of world diplomats.

* * *

“The mountains of Rwanda radiate warmth and benevolence, tempt with beauty and silence, a crystal clear, windless air, the peace and exquisiteness of their lines and shapes. In the mornings, a transparent haze suffuses the green valleys.”

Mr President,
 

Members of this House,

That’s how Ryszard Kapuscinski describes Rwanda’s landscape. Rwanda is known in the vernacular as the “land of a thousand hills”.

One of these thousand hills is in Murambi. Tens of thousands of Tutsis fled there when the genocide in Rwanda began 20 years ago.

“You’ll be safe up on the hill, in the newly built school,” the bishop had said.

But in the early morning of 21 April 1994, militia groups surrounded the school building and began to kill – with machetes, knives and clubs: a bloodshed which seemed to last forever.

Tens of thousands of people died on this hill in one single day.

Jonathan Nturo survived the massacre as a small boy. Today he says looking over the hill, “I’m surprised sometimes that grass still grows here. That life goes on.”

Yes, it’s difficult to understand how Earth can continue to turn after the horrors of genocide.

That’s how I felt the first time I visited Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald and Auschwitz. Indeed, that’s how everyone feels when they visit these places. But the grass still grows there, too. Now in spring, the trees are even blossoming.

As a German, I’m careful about making historical comparisons. They don’t do justice to the unique and incomparable nature of these crimes. Indeed, they don’t do justice to the unique nature of the history and culture of individual nations.

And yet: as a German I can’t talk about a genocide in Africa without remembering the one for which we were responsible. These were fateful and tragic events on our continents. They influence our actions to this very day and they influence our relations with one another.

These tragic events may be as different as our landscapes: the hills of Rwanda, the forests of Auschwitz, the poppy fields of Verdun. Yet the lessons we learned from them form a link between us. They are the lessons of our shared humanity.

The most important lesson which has to be taken from a day of remembrance like today is:

never again!

Yes, never again. Yet, how we can live up to this responsibility is a much more difficult question.

For let’s be honest, the international community has shouted loud and clear “never again!” before. That was in 1948, after the Holocaust, when the United Nations adopted the Genocide Convention. 

But we were unable to keep this pledge. The international community failed when it withdrew its blue helmets from Rwanda in the midst of the violence.And we also have to admit that in the present day, the demons of genocide have by no means been banished:

Even though the international community developed the concept of “responsibility to protect” in response to what happened in Rwanda, even though it has improved prevention, operational capability and international criminal justice. We don’t talk of genocide everywhere but we’re faced with never-ending bloodshed in the Congo, Central Africa and Syria.

We can never make amends to Jonathan Nturo and all other victims of crimes against humanity for the loss of their children, fathers, mothers and friends. However, we owe them one thing, even if we’ve to honestly admit that we can’t stop every injustice or instance of bloodshed: we owe it to them not to give in to feelings of powerlessness and most certainly not those of indifference – to not only speak out but do everything in our power to prevent genocide!

Rwanda is in the process of coming to grips with the past, of building a new Rwanda. So many new developments have been emerging all over Africa in the last few years. Africa is changing more quickly than our perception of the continent.

That’s why I travelled to Ethiopia, Tanzania and Angola last week. As different as these countries are, I heard the same appeal from almost everyone with whom I spoke. The appeal was: we don’t want to be beggars at Europe’s gates. The African continent is viable on its own and, at least potentially, can provide food and development for everyone.

When it comes to peace and stability, many say: we Africans want to take responsibility for our own security! We don’t want to ask Europe to send troops but, rather, we want to be able to guarantee our own security, to act on our own. 

Members of this House, that also has to be in our interest. Of course, we Europeans also want Africa to take its fate in its own hands. Africa is a continent on the rise and we’ve to do everything in our power to support its progress.We Europeans have to increasingly see ourselves as the partners of states in Africa. We need partners for the global challenges we both face and which we know only too well we can only master if we work together.

Both sides have realised how close our continents have moved together. We’ve realised how much we depend on the stability of the other side. We Europeans experience that, for example, when refugees from Africa’s crisis regions reach Europe’s borders. And Africans notice this when the economic crisis in Europe also makes its impact felt in Africa.

Our goal is easy to describe: strong, responsible partners in Africa. But there are many ways to achieve this.

Africa is developing far too quickly and too diversely for us to give our political engagement a snappy motto. Although the world of politics and the media are keen to find such a motto – Africa is neither simply a continent racked by crises nor a continent full of opportunities. Former Federal President Horst Köhler is most likely right: such judgements say much more about us than they do about Africa.

My view is that the tools available within the scope of Germany’s policy on Africa have to be as diverse as Africa’s development.

Depending on the country and on its situation, these tools comprise economic investment as well as disarmament and the containment of small arms; cultural exchange as well as road construction; strengthening the rule of law as well as training security forces.

I’ve seen all of these instruments on my trip and they will all be included in the German Government’s Africa policy guidelines which we’re currently drawing up.

Foreign policy is a balancing act between the quest for common ground and respect for our differences – also the recognition of what is incompatible.

Our common ground with Africa – I saw this very clearly during my trip – goes far beyond “never again war and genocide”.First of all, Europeans and Africans have learned to work with instead of against their neighbours. This is the guiding principle of regional integration. 

I fear that we sometimes underestimate what is being achieved nowadays by African organisations. Many simply don’t know that the African Union is currently deploying 70,000 troops in conflicts within Africa and is seeking earnestly and not always successfully to restore stability where it has been lost. Strengthening Africa’s own responsibility, which is necessary for this, played a major role at the EU-Africa summit this week.

We Germans are making very concrete contributions towards this by, for example, supporting the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre in Ghana or the Peace and Security Centre, which is being built in the grounds of the African Union in Addis Ababa and is due to be opened next year, more punctually than some construction projects in Germany. I was able to see this project with my own eyes during my Africa trip.

Second, we’ve learned to protect people’s diversity.

In a speech to mark the 20th anniversary of the genocide, Rwanda’s Ambassador to Germany said, “We’re building a Rwanda in which everyone [...] can develop their potential and enjoy the same rights.”

Living in diversity – that’s only possible in a state governed by the rule of law on which everyone can rely. I’m firmly convinced that this diversity includes freedom of opinion or religion as well as freedom of sexual orientation.

That, too, was a principle which played a role on every stop on my trip. For example, during my visit to the German-Tanzanian Law Centre in Dar es Salaam, where I met students who I hope will have an impact one day on the rule of law in East Africa. Many of their teachers studied at German universities. I’d therefore like to take this opportunity to express my thanks to the many German universities engaged on the African continent, in particular the German Academic Exchange Service, which has worked with boundless energy for this cooperation through its scholarship programmes.Third, we’ve learned that peace or conflict also have a material basis, especially when it is missing. 

The genocide 20 years ago was fuelled by material need and scarce resources – conflicts which those in power used systematically to get as many people as possible involved in the murders.

The lessons learned from the genocide therefore include the pledge of peace just as much as the pledge of prosperity. One is inconceivable without the other.

The Congo, Nigeria and Angola – all of these states teach us that oil, gas, gold and diamonds alone cannot ensure a prosperous development in which everyone can participate. Rather, this has to be organised at the political level.

Only if the economic upswing creates opportunities for everyone and enables them to enjoy a measure of prosperity can it promote social cohesion. Only then will it ensure lasting peace.

More than to anyone else, we owe this twofold pledge of peace and prosperity to our young people.

I’ll never forget one impression from my Africa trip. In Addis Ababa I met the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Ms Dlamini-Zuma. After our talks, a journalist asked her a clear question, “What is Africa’s greatest expectation of Europe?”

And Ms Zuma gave an equally clear answer, something which is not exactly typical of a politician. She said, “Our young people! For their sake, we want to cooperate with Europe, for their vocational training, for their economic prospects.”

In response, the journalist asked the inverse question, “And what can Europe expect of Africa?”

And again Ms Zuma replied, “Our young people! Our young people are our asset and Europe will also benefit from this asset.”Ladies and gentlemen, 

The lessons to be learned from the tragic events in our past form a bond between us. 20 years after the genocide, Rwanda is on its way to a new future, without suppressing or forgetting the past.

The thousand hills of Rwanda are and will remain one of Africa’s fateful landscapes.

Roméo Dallaire, who cam to Rwanda in 1993 as the commander of the blue helmets, exclaimed on seeing the thousand hills: “This a Garden of Eden”. Only a few months later he had to stand by full of shame and anger and watch the massacre.

The memory is etched on the thousand hills. Their name remains linked to the crime against humanity committed 20 years ago.

Members of this House,Alongside all the memories which lie in this landscape –may the thousand hills again be home and provide fertile land to those building Rwanda today.

* * *

Speech by Foreign Minister Steinmeier in the German Bundestag remembering the victims of the genocide in Rwanda. Federal Foreign Office, April 4, 2014 

--DCH

Germany and Britain Holding Hands on Ukraine

Michael Roth is a German Minister of State. In this speech at the 64^th Königswinter Conference in Cambridge, England, Roth summarizes the conventional western view of the Ukraine crisis. 

* * *

The international order has been severely shaken by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Until recently such a situation in Europe would have seemed unimaginable. We all agree that Russia’s actions are absolutely unacceptable and in breach of international law. Its behaviour is a challenge for Europe and the foundations on which it is built. Coming hard on the heels of the economic and financial crisis, this is the second big test Europe has had to face in a very short period.

So have we as Europeans managed to remain united in this crisis? The answer is yes – also thanks to London and Berlin acting in unison. EU leaders unanimously agreed on a three-step approach. Asset freezes and travel bans against those responsible for violating Ukraine’s territorial integrity are now in place. The USA, Canada and others have acted in the same vein. All this has sent a clear signal: Russia’s behaviour here is something we cannot tolerate. We stand ready to take further restrictive measures if Russia continues to escalate the situation.

But it’s crucial at this point also to weigh our options very carefully. While considering how best to respond to Russia, we must make sure we retain the necessary room for maneuvre. Our aim is not to “punish” Russian aggression but to deter further escalation by the most effective and credible means available. And to facilitate de-escalation wherever a window of opportunity opens.

We must also ask ourselves who would pay the highest price for further escalation. In Europe it’s not the United Kingdom or Germany that would pay this price but our partners in Central and Eastern Europe. They are the most vulnerable countries here. We may of course be forced to take additional steps against Russia. And in that case we’d have to actively demonstrate our solidarity with those partners in Europe that need help.

Let me make another more general point here. We Europeans should take more pride, I feel, in what we’ve achieved. The strength of the EU lies, after all, in its soft power. Of course, as we’ve seen in recent weeks, that almost inevitably forces us into opposition with Russia, which remains stuck in a 19th-century mindset – a mindset in which big countries determine the fate of smaller countries.

Yet our diplomatic and political approach to the crisis in Ukraine is absolutely right, I believe. We remain united, we look for ways to avoid further escalation, we keep channels of communication open and seek to de-escalate wherever a window of opportunity opens. I’m fully convinced that in the medium and long term our European approach will prevail. The 19th century is over and done with. In the long run, one power is bound to lose out – and that will be Russia. In this sense, the Economist is quite wrong to proclaim a “new world order”, as it does in its current issue.

Later in his speech, Roth notes a series of disagreements between Germany and Britain over the purpose of the European Union:

We don’t believe that the EU can or should limit itself to providing some kind of easily quantifiable “output legitimacy”. To most Germans that would seem just as absurd as the idea of quantifying the value of Hyde Park by counting how many potatoes grow there. To us Germans, Europe has a different raison d’être, it’s not just a free trade area yielding economic benefits. Europe isn’t just about business. It’s also and above all a community of values and solidarity.

As you know, we Germans are very attached to what we call the social market economy – the balancing of economic prosperity with social justice. I’m firmly convinced that longer-term growth can be achieved only if you also invest in social cohesion. Europe can’t simply be a collection of islands of prosperity. The most pressing issue at the moment is the enormously high youth unemployment in many EU countries. In Greece more than 60% of the young are out of work. Obviously we can’t afford to lose a whole generation of young Europeans, many of whom are highly qualified. So we need to demonstrate greater solidarity and give a helping hand to Europe’s poorer regions – in our best own interest. A politically and economically strong, but also socially just Europe is what makes us so unique. That’s our global trademark.

I share the British view that we need to regain people’s trust by focusing on solving real problems rather than banning olive oil containers. The EU needs to learn how to prioritize. In President Barroso’s words: “Europe needs to be big on big things and smaller on smaller things.” But we won’t turn the clock back in the EU by reversing integration. As far as Treaty changes are concerned, new “red cards”, re-editing passages referring to “ever closer union” or repatriating competences are things we can’t go along with.

As you’re all aware many Germans love the “s-word” – subsidiarity.  Well, I personally am not particularly fond of the word. Maybe that makes me a bad German. But rather than discussing whether we need more or less Europe, I think we should focus our energies on how to achieve a better Europe.

* * *

Speech by Minister of State Michael Roth at the 64th Königswinter Conference in Cambridge, Federal Foreign Office, March 27, 2014.