Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts

Sunday, August 24, 2014

Rouhani: Iran's Deterrence Doctrine

In a meeting with Iran’s Civil Aviation Organization on August 24, 2014, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani set forth Iran’s defense doctrine: 

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President Hassan Rouhani stressing the need for strengthens and develops the country’s defense industry as part of the deterrence doctrine, said: “Our defense capability will never be used for invading any country, even a weak state. We are not for aggression.” . . .

President, however, warned against enemy threats against Iran and said, “We do not stand idle in the face of enemy threats and plots against our national sovereignty.”

“Islamic Republic’s strategy is effective defense;” said he, and that “Iran does not seek confrontation or interference with internal affairs of the other countries.”

Dr.Rouhani pointed to Iran’s military power as a capability to increase regional security and emphasized that with boosting military, “We do not seek an arms race, but we ourselves will make the necessary decisions to defend ourselves and we do not seek the permission of others in this regard.”

“Iran never seeks to obtain Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) or any other unconventional weapons, despite the fact that it is itself a victim of chemical attack; it rather wants a world without WMD,” noted Dr.Rouhani.

“Our military will secure the country and its neighbors,” added president Rouhani.

“Our neighbors should know that if we become powerful in defense industries, it is not merely for our own security, but it is for the security of the entire region,” Dr.Rouhani stated.

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Iran defense doctrine is deterrence," August 24, 2014, President of Iran website

Saturday, August 16, 2014

Demographic Dilemmas in Iran

Garrett Nada, assistant editor of The Iran Primer at the United States Institute of Peace, has an excellent piece on the gyrations in Iran’s family planning policy over the past three decades. It was quite the roller-coaster. The piece has some revealing graphs and pictures, which I have not reproduced. These excerpts give the main picture:

Iran has a numbers problem. Over the past 35 years, Tehran’s family planning policy has gyrated so radically—from encouraging too many babies to producing too few—that the Islamic Republic faces existential economic dangers.

      The origin of the problem dates to the 1979 revolution. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini called on women to produce a new Islamic generation for both cultural and security reasons. Khomeini wanted to create a paramilitary force of 20 million religious volunteers to protect Iran from foreign influence. Over the next decade, a baby boom almost doubled the population from 34 to 62 million.

      But the theocracy, drained by the costs of the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, gradually realized that it could not feed, cloth, house, educate and eventually employ the growing numbers. So with the supreme leader’s approval, Tehran enacted one of the world’s most progressive family planning programs to slow population growth.

            The program broke many taboos in a culture that favored large families. Clerics gave sermons on reducing family size, while female volunteers were sent door-to-door to encourage women to have fewer children. New billboards declared, “Fewer Children, Better Life.” Before marriage, couples had to take family planning classes. Health centers dispensed free birth control pills and condoms.

            Ironically, the world’s only modern theocracy was home to the only state-supported condom factory in the Middle East, which reportedly produced 45 million condoms a year in 30 different shapes, colors and flavors by 2006. The United Nations and population organizations cited Iran’s program as a model for the Islamic world and developing nations. The United Nations bestowed awards on Iranian practitioners three times from 1999 to 2011.

           The program worked. The fertility rate plummeted—from 5.5 births per woman in 1988 to about 2.22 births in 2000.

      But the initiative was almost too successful. By 2006, the birthrate dropped to 1.9 births per woman—below replacement rate. As a result, Iran’s population is aging. The average age is now 28.3 years. It is expected to increase to 37 years by 2030, according to a U.N. projection. An increasingly elderly and dependent population would heavily tax public infrastructure and social services.

      Last year, the government began debating steps to prevent the kind of population crisis facing Japan, where sales of adult diapers are expected to exceed baby diapers this year. So far, however, the executive and legislative branches have not agreed on how to raise the birthrate. Some lawmakers want to criminalize permanent forms of birth control, while health officials and experts favor creating government incentives for couples to have more children. . . .
            The government introduced more substantive changes in 2012, after Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said the family planning program had been “wrong” and “one of the mistakes” of the 1990s. “Government officials were wrong on this matter, and I, too, had a part. May God and history forgive us,” he said. “If we move forward like this, we will be a country of elderly people in a not-too-distant future,” he warned.

            Khamenei urged the government to introduce measures to boost the population—now almost 80 million — to 150 million or more. The Ministry of Health then pulled funding from the family planning program and ended free vasectomies to encourage larger families. It eventually replaced birth control classes with ones that urged having more children.

            In the spring of 2014, Khamenei began pushing even harder for an increase in Iran’s fertility rate. “A country without a young population is tantamount to a country without creativity, progress, excitement and enthusiasm,” he warned on May 5, which is International Midwives’ Day.  . . .

            Since Khamenei’s decree, the government has reportedly added new incentives, which include lengthening maternity leave, ensuring female job security after childbirth, and subsidizing hospital care. In June, parliament debated controversial legislation aimed at criminalizing male and female sterilization. The bill, approved by 143 out of 231 members of parliament in August, must be reviewed by the Guardian Council to determine its compatibility with Islam.

            But the bill has produced a backlash from health officials and women’s groups. Mohammad Esmail Motlagh, a senior health official, argued that the legislation would violate citizens’ rights. He instead called on lawmakers to use voluntary incentives to encourage couples to have more children.

            Reformists particularly fear major changes to the family program could negatively impact women’s status, especially in the workplace, where they are already underrepresented. Some 60 percent of university students are female, but only about 12 percent of the workforce, according to the Statistical Center of Iran. Vice President for Women and Family Affairs, Shahindokht Molaverdi, noted that no other country has ever used punitive measures to increase fertility rates. She also warned that outlawing surgical procedures could push contraceptive services underground. . . .

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Garrett Nada, “From Baby Boom to Baby Shortage,” The Iran Primer, August 13, 2014

Wednesday, July 2, 2014

Dueling Op-Eds on Iran

As the Iran nuclear talks approach a deadline on July 20, US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif have each contributed op-eds on the crisis. Kerry's appeared in The Washington Post; Zarif's in Le Monde. The Iran Primer of the US Institute of Peace has the transcripts as well as a link to Zarif's five minute video message.

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Transcript of video message "We Can Make History"
 
            In the next three weeks, we have a unique opportunity to make history: To forge a comprehensive agreement over Iran's nuclear energy program; and to end an unnecessary crisis that has distracted us from addressing together our common challenges, such as the horrifying events of past few weeks in Iraq.
 
            We could have resolved the nuclear issue in 2005. But then, people didn't believe me when I said that Iranians are allergic to pressure.
 
            The Bush administration torpedoed the deal by demanding that we abandon enrichment, altogether. They then opted for pressure and sanctions. For 8 years.
 
            The sanctions were crippling -- even deadly; literally.
 
            Iranian cancer patients could not buy medicine with their own money, because banks around the world had been bullied by the US Treasury to avoid transferring Iranian funds.
 
            But sanctions did not cripple our nuclear program.
 
            Neither did the murder of our nuclear scientists, the sabotage of our nuclear facilities - with potentially disastrous environmental ramifications - or the repeated military threats.
In fact, they achieved exactly the opposite:
 
            Insisting on no enrichment resulted in a 100-fold increase in our centrifuges: from less than 200 to almost 20,000;
 
            Refusing to sell fuel for our American-built research reactor, forced us to produce our own fuel by increasing enrichment levels: from 3.5% to 20%.
 
            Depriving Iranian cancer patients from medical radio-isotopes, compelled us to build a heavy water reactor, going from an idea then to a full-fledged plant, to be commissioned soon; and
 
            Threats to bomb our nuclear facilities out of existence, obliged us to build Fordow, which is protected by our mountains.
 
            Western governments cried foul, ignoring that they had brought this upon themselves.
 
            As we approach July 20th, I feel compelled to warn again that pursuing a game of chicken in an attempt to extract last minute concessions cannot achieve anything better than what it achieved in 2005.
 
            To those who continue to believe that sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table, I can only say that pressure has been tried for the past 8 years, in fact for the past 35 years.
 
            It didn't bring the Iranian people to kneel in submission. And it will not now nor in the future. We still have time to exit this spiral of escalation.Try mutual respect. It works. We are trying to reach a deal. Not a good deal or a bad deal, but a doable and lasting deal. And any deal, by definition, is the outcome of mutual understanding—not imposition by one side or the other.
 
            We are willing to take concrete measures to guarantee that our nuclear program will always remain peaceful.
 
            We still have time to put an end to the myth that Iran is seeking to build a bomb. And we're backed by over 250 years of non-aggression to substantiate our assertion.
 
            My government remains committed to ending this unnecessary crisis by July 20th. I hope my counterparts are, too.
 
Excerpts from Foreign Miniser Zarif’s Op-ed in Le Monde
 
            Today we have got a unique opportunity for talks with the P5+1. But it is to regret that there are still some on the opposite side who would not stop dreaming.
 
            There is this political will to reach a comprehensive, long-term solution that is respected by both sides. But the negotiations can only become successful when the entire parties dedicate themselves to finding acceptable procedures which would be in agreement with the interim deal, that is, to guarantee that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful as well as to remove the entire Security Council sanctions and the multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.
 
            We are willing to guarantee that our nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. But we will not compromise our technical advancement or our scientists.
 
            No one can go back in time. There has been sacrifice made. Today abilities have changed greatly than the past. There is know-how and expertise come by none of which could be forgotten. Pressure and sanctions have also proved ineffective.
 
            I appeal for these illusions not to derail a process that could put an end to a pointless crisis.
 
(Translation via the Young Journalists Club and AFP)
 
Excerpts from Secretary of State Kerry’s Op-ed in The Washington Post
 
            All along, these negotiations have been about a choice for Iran’s leaders. They can agree to the steps necessary to assure the world that their country’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful and not be used to build a weapon, or they can squander a historic opportunity to end Iran’s economic and diplomatic isolation and improve the lives of their people.
 
            Diplomacy and leadership are marked by tough calls. This shouldn’t be one of them.
 
            Iranian officials have stated repeatedly and unambiguously that they have no intention of building a nuclear weapon and that their nuclear activities are designed solely to fulfill civilian needs. Assuming that’s true, it’s not a hard proposition to prove.
 
            The United States and our partners have demonstrated to Iran how serious we are. During the negotiations to reach the Joint Plan of Action, we extended our hand to the Iranians and met with them directly to understand what Iran wanted from its nuclear program. Along with our international partners, we helped chart a path that would allow Iran to have a domestic program for exclusively peaceful purposes. We proved that we were flexible in offering financial relief.
 
            Throughout these talks, Iran’s negotiators have been serious. Iran has also defied the expectations of some by meeting its obligations under the Joint Plan of Action, which has allowed time and space for the comprehensive negotiations to proceed. Specifically, Iran has been eliminating its stockpile of higher levels of enriched uranium, limited its enrichment capability by not installing or starting up additional centrifuges, refrained from making further advances at its enrichment facilities and heavy-water reactor, and allowed new and more frequent inspections. In exchange, the European Union and the P5+1 have provided limited financial relief to Iran, even as the architecture of international sanctions and the vast majority of sanctions themselves remained firmly in place.
 
            Now Iran must choose. During the comprehensive negotiations, the world has sought nothing more than for Iran to back up its words with concrete and verifiable actions. We have, over the past several months, proposed a series of reasonable, verifiable and easily achievable measures that would ensure Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and that its program is limited to peaceful purposes. In return, Iran would be granted phased relief from nuclear-related sanctions.
 
            What will Iran choose? Despite many months of discussion, we don’t know yet. We do know that substantial gaps still exist between what Iran’s negotiators say they are willing to do and what they must do to achieve a comprehensive agreement. We also know that their public optimism about the potential outcome of these negotiations has not been matched, to date, by the positions they have articulated behind closed doors.
 
            These gaps aren’t caused by excessive demands on our part. On the contrary, the E.U. and P5+1 negotiators have listened closely to Iran’s questions and concerns and showed flexibility to the extent possible consistent with our fundamental goals for this negotiation. We have worked closely with Iran to design a pathway for a program that meets all of the requirements for peaceful, civilian purposes.
 
            There remains a discrepancy, however, between Iran’s professed intent with respect to its nuclear program and the actual content of that program to date. The divide between what Iran says and what it has done underscores why these negotiations are necessary and why the international community united to impose sanctions in the first place.
 
            Iran’s claim that the world should simply trust its words ignores the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported since 2002 on dozens of violations by Iran of its international nonproliferation obligations, starting in the early 1980s. The U.N. Security Council responded by adopting four resolutions under Chapter VII, requiring Iran to take steps to address these violations. These issues cannot be dismissed; they must be addressed by the Iranians if a comprehensive solution is to be reached. These are not just the expectations of any one country, but of the community of nations.
 
            To gain relief from sanctions, the world is simply asking Iran to demonstrate that its nuclear activities are what it claims them to be.
            If Iran is able to make these choices, there will be positive outcomes for the Iranian people and for their economy. Iran will be able to use its significant scientific know-how for international civil nuclear cooperation. Businesses could return to Iran, bringing much needed investment, jobs and many additional goods and services. Iran could have greater access to the international financial system. The result would be an Iranian economy that begins to grow at a significant and sustainable pace, boosting the standard of living among the Iranian population. If Iran is not ready to do so, international sanctions will tighten and Iran’s isolation will deepen.
 
Click here for the full text.
 
British Foreign Secretary Hague's July 2 statement
            “This is a crucial moment in international efforts to resolve one of the most challenging foreign policy issues of our day. The UK is fully committed to reaching an agreement which ensures Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. To achieve this, Iran will need to be realistic about the steps required to resolve the international community’s serious concerns about its nuclear programme. We will not accept a deal at any price. A deal that does not provide sufficient assurances that Iran will not develop a nuclear weapon is not in the interests of the UK, the region or the international community.
 
            “Achieving an agreement is far from certain. Significant differences remain between the E3+3 and Iran which are yet to be bridged. But I am convinced that the current negotiations are the best opportunity we have had in years to resolve this issue. Over the next three weeks, an intensive effort will be required by all sides. We will continue to work closely with our E3+3 partners to test to the full the scope for achieving the deal the international community requires. The benefits of a comprehensive deal for Iran are clear: if Iran is willing to take the steps needed, significant economic benefits will follow. Ultimately, this would lead to the lifting of all nuclear related sanctions and Iran being treated like any other non-nuclear weapons state.”
 

Thursday, June 26, 2014

Iran Leaders on Iraq Crisis

The valuable Iran Primer site maintained by the United States Institute of Peace has collected the observations of Iranian officials on the crisis in Iraq. 

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President Hassan Rouhani:


“The Islamic Republic will not tolerate violence and terror as foreign-backed takfiri militants wreak havoc in northern Iraq.

“As the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we will not tolerate the [acts of] violence and terror and we fight violence and terrorism in the region and in the world.

 “We all should practically and verbally confront terrorist groups. We can think about it [cooperation with the United States] if we see America starts confronting the terrorist groups in Iraq or elsewhere.

 “Iran has never dispatched any forces to Iraq and it is very unlikely it will ever happen.”
 -- June 14, 2014 during a press conference

“Regarding the holy Shia shines in Karbala, Najaf, Khadhimiya and Samarra, we announce to the killers and terrorists that the big Iranian nation will not hesitate to protect holy shrines.

“These terrorist groups, and those that fund them, both in the region and in the international arena, are nothing, and hopefully they will be put in their own place.”
--June 18, 2014 in a speech to a crowd in Lorestan province

“I advise Muslim countries that support the terrorists with their petrodollars to stop.

“Tomorrow you will be targeted... by these savage terrorists. Wash your hands of killing and the killing of Muslims.

“For centuries, Shiites and Sunnis have lived alongside each other in Iran, Iraq, the Levant, Lebanon, the Persian Gulf and North Africa...in peaceful coexistence.”
-- June 22, 2014, according to press

“If the Iraqi government wants help, we will study it; of course no demand has yet been raised until today but we are ready for help within the framework of the international laws and at the request of the Iraqi nation.

“Of course, we should know that help and assistance is one issue, and interference and entrance [into the battlefield] is another. If the Iraqi government demands us we will help them, but the entrance of the Iranian troops [onto the scene of battles in Iraq] has never been considered.

“Since the onset of its establishment, the Islamic Republic has never taken such measures and we have never sent our troops to another country for operations. Of course, we will provide countries with our consultative views.”
--June 24, 2014, according to press

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei


“We are strongly against the interference of the US and others in Iraq’s internal affairs and do not approve of it, because we believe that the Iraqi government, nation and religious authority are capable of ending this sedition and will end it, God willing.

“The United States is dissatisfied with the result of elections in Iraq and they want to deprive the Iraqi people of their achievement of a democratic system, which they achieved without U.S. interference.”

“What is happening in Iraq is not a war between Shiites and Sunnis. Arrogant powers want to use the remnants of Saddam’s regime and takfiri [ISIS] extremists to deprive Iraq of stability and tranquility.”
-- June 22, 2014 at a meeting with judiciary officials

“The current crisis in Iraq is the result of the meddling and collaboration of the western and regional enemies of the Iraqi nation, who are seeking to prevent the Iraqi people’s will and determination from coming into action.”
-- June 16, 2014 in a meeting with Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani

 “Reports in Western media about possible Iran-U.S. cooperation are part of the West’s “psychological warfare” and are “completely unreal.”

 “As we have announced, we will examine the issue of helping (Iraq) within the framework of international regulations in case of an official request by the Iraqi government and this will be completely a bilateral process and has nothing to do with a third country.”
 --June 16, 2014 according to Fars News Agency

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The Iran Primer, “Iran’s Leaders on Iraq Crisis and ISIS,” June 26, 2014. The article contains utterances from several other Iranian leaders. 

Thursday, June 19, 2014

Saudi Editor: Detach Oil Province from Iran

A blast from the past comes from Jamil Al-Dhiyabi, deputy editor of the Saudi daily Al-Hayat, published in London. He calls in an editorial for detaching Al-Ahwaz from Iran. Ahwaz, which includes the Iranian province of Khuzestan, figured greatly in the news some thirty-five years ago. It was the principal object of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran in 1980, which hoped to rouse the native Arabs (about half the province's population) into rebellion. As Al-Dhiyabi notes, it has lots of oil and other good stuff. I suppose we can mark this down as another episode in Saudi Arabia's contribution to a "rule-based" international system. 

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"Though I support [the decision of] Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait to grant some $20 billion to Egypt [for the sake of its] stability and rehabilitation, I wish to ask a legitimate question in light of the current situation: What would happen if Arab Gulf states like the ones mentioned above spent these billions on supporting [the cause of] an independent Arab emirate in Al-Ahwaz, so that it becomes a thorn in the side of Iran? Do the Gulf states realize the benefits they could reap in terms of the future of the coming generations and [ensuring] their security and stability? How long would the Iranian 'demon' be occupied with its own affairs if it lost a strategic region so rich in resources? What would happen if the Arab Gulf states supported the Ahwazi plan? Would this not weaken Iran's [expansionist] ambitions and thwart its plans?
"... The residents of Al-Ahwaz (both Sunni and Shi'ite) are pure Arabs, who await help from their brethren, having suffered disasters, oppression, poverty, and discrimination at the hands of the Persian regime and its racist policy. Al-Ahwaz is a rich Arab emirate that occupies fertile land with plenty of water, large rivers, minerals, oil, and natural gas. Despite these plentiful natural resources, the Arabs there live under the yoke of oppression and in degrading poverty. The population of Al-Ahwaz is 9-11 million, out of 70 million Iranians. According to statistics, this province has some 183 billion barrels of [crude] oil, which are more than 85% of Iran's oil deposits. Furthermore, statistics show that Al-Ahwaz has the world's second-largest natural gas deposits after Russia.
"Just imagine what the map would look like if this Arab emirate was independent from Iran, with [its own] regime, army and resources, and was an ally of the Arab Gulf states and the seventh member of the GCC. What would have been the state of the 'crazed' Iran in terms of [its ambition to] establish a Persian empire at the expense of Arab states?
"So long as Iran continues on its deviant path and continues interfering in the affairs of Arab countries, we need a similar brave program, as a counterweight to [Iran's] expansionist plan, which will allow this Arab emirate [of Al-Ahwaz] to stand on its feet and confront the Persian plan. [This can be achieved by means of]  material and moral support for its people.
"An independent Al-Ahwaz emirate will strengthen the Arab Gulf, especially when most of its people are members of Arab tribes who yearn to confront the Iranian [expansionist] plans... This way, the Gulf states can confront the Iranian advance, instead of groveling before Iran, reconciling with it and rushing into its arms in order to force it to recant and abandon its dream of establishing Greater Persia and end its growing influence in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq...
"Therefore, the Gulf states should formulate a unified and comprehensive strategy, in order to deal with Iranian policy and plans in the region... and convey a uniform message that would force Iran to consider its steps and restrain its devilish behavior. The first thing to do is to support the intifada of the Arab Al-Ahwaz [province], openly and fearlessly, in order to confront Iran's shameless actions in Arab countries."
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Monday, June 2, 2014

Khamenei: What Angers the West

The following are excerpts from an address by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khameini, as translated by MEMRI-TV. He spoke on Iran’s Channel 1; the video was posted to the internet on May 21, 2014:

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In the past century or two, as the result of the disgraceful and threatening phenomenon of colonialism and global arrogance, the world has suffered great catastrophes. . . . When a nation or a country opposes this ugly habit, the [West] brings disaster upon them. . . .

This makes global arrogance angry. It becomes confused when a certain people in an important country, with a very rich history and unique characteristics, stands up to this ugly phenomenon of dominating and dominated [countries].

This is what angers the U.S. This is what unites the arrogant countries against Iran. Perhaps this is what draws the world's nations to Iran. Perhaps most of those governments that do not dare to oppose the rule of hegemony themselves are pleased that the Iranian regime opposes it, even if they do not have the courage to say so.

We see this clearly in our international interactions. Our enemy's hostility stems from the Iranian regime's opposition to the rule of hegemony and to the ugly habit of dividing the world into those who dominate and those who are dominated.

Everything else is nothing but a pretext. Today, the pretext is the nuclear issue, another day, it is human rights, and some other time, it will be something else. They want to dissuade the Iranian regime from opposing the world's aggressive and bribe-taking bullies and oppressors.

Of course, this will not happen. . . . [Iran] will manage to overcome its problems, to develop, and to increase its presence and its influence, despite the West. This is what angered them.

They got angry. Let them. In the words of our dear martyr Beheshti, "Let them die in their anger" . . .

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China and Iran Taking Relations to New High

From China's Foreign Ministry:

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On May 22, 2014, President Xi Jinping held talks with President Hassan Rouhani of Iran in Shanghai. The two heads of state jointly planned for the development of China-Iran relationship, and announced to join their hands to promote the friendly cooperation in all fields to a new high. Xi Jinping stressed that China is willing to continue its efforts for an early, comprehensive and proper settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue.

Xi Jinping expressed that China and Iran enjoy a traditional friendship and enormous cooperation potentials. China attaches great importance to the bilateral relationship, and is willing to make joint efforts with Iran to uplift the China-Iran relations to a new high. The two sides should maintain high-level contacts and exchanges, promote bilateral exchanges between the two governments, parliaments, local and non-governmental sectors, deepen understanding and mutual trust, expand trade contacts and steadily promote cooperation in the fields of oil, gas and petrochemicals. In history, the two peoples carried out friendly exchanges through the Silk Road. China welcomes Iran to actively participate in the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Silk Road On the Sea of the 21st Century, bringing along the cooperation in infrastructure construction and other fields and start the projects such as high-speed railways and economic parks. The two sides should strengthen security cooperation, jointly combat terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational crimes. Both China and Iran boast their ancient civilizations, and should strengthen people-to-people and cultural exchanges, set up cultural centers in each other's country as early as possible and promote cooperation in tourism.

Rouhani said that the development of the bilateral relations has been sped up since he met with President Xi Jinping in Bishkek last year. Iran-China friendly exchanges enjoy a long history and there is no obstacle in the current relations. He was optimistic about the bilateral cooperation. Iran values the strengthening of bilateral cooperation in the fields of economy, trade, energy and transportation infrastructure from a long-term perspective, and welcomes the Chinese enterprises to invest in Iran. Iran supports the bilateral cultural exchanges. China is an important force in promoting peace and development of Asia and the world at large. Iran congratulates the positive results achieved at the CICA Shanghai Summit, and is willing to strengthen cooperation with China on the platform of CICA, joining efforts to fight against terrorism and extremist forces, maintaining regional security and stability.

Xi Jinping pointed out that China respects Iran's rights for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and always believes that dialogues and negotiations are the only way right and effective to properly resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. China welcomes the recent progress made in the dialogues on the Iranian nuclear issue, and hopes that all relevant parties continue their efforts and reach a comprehensive agreement at an early date. China is willing to continue the strengthening of communication and coordination with Iran and its constructive role in promoting the negotiation process.


Rouhani briefed Iran's position on the relevant issue. He emphasized that Iran should be guaranteed its legitimate rights and interests based on the "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons". it is for the benefit of all sides to early achieve a comprehensive agreement through negotiations. Iran appreciates China's efforts in promoting peace talks and hopes that China continues to play a positive role.

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Friday, May 23, 2014

Zarif: Respect Iran's Rights

This piece by Robin Wright in the New Yorker details her recent conversation with Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, May 23, 2014:


 * * *
 
I first met Mohammad Javad Zarif, the Iranian foreign minister, in the nineteen-eighties, when he was a junior member of the Iranian delegation at the United Nations. This week’s issue of The New Yorker includes a Profile based on twenty-five years of conversations with him, including four in Tehran and New York since last September. Zarif is now the pivotal broker in nuclear talks between his government and six world powers—Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States. After eight months of diplomacy, the serious drafting of terms for a long-term deal to insure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon began last week, in Vienna. The deadline for reaching an agreement is July 20th.

A nuclear deal would almost certainly affect Iran’s political future. “If we can ascertain and show to our people that the West is ready to deal with Iran on the basis of mutual respect and mutual interests and equal footing, then it will have an impact on almost every aspect of Iran’s foreign policy behavior—and some aspects of Iran’s domestic policy,” Zarif said.

Iran and the six powers must address points of contention on virtually every aspect of a nuclear deal, from the future of suspect facilities to accounting for past programs, but Zarif has been noticeably upbeat about prospects for a breakthrough. I asked him how difficult it would be to reach an agreement. The red lines—particularly between Washington and Tehran—often seem insurmountable.

“It’s going to be both hard and easy,” he said. “Easy, because ostensibly we have a convergence of views on the objectives. We don’t want nuclear weapons, and they say the objective is to insure Iran does not have nuclear weapons. So, if that is the objective, in my view it’s already achieved. We just have to find mechanisms for agreeing on the process.”

But the details “may be cumbersome,” Zarif added. “More so because those who do not want to see an agreement, those who seek their interests in greater mistrust and conflict, are hard at work. And they do their best to prevent.” He presumably meant opponents in the United States and Israel, as well as in Iran. But he predicted that they were regrouping to prepare for what comes next if a deal is struck.

“Now they have had time to collect themselves and to come up with probably new tactics,” he said. “I still believe that they’ll lose. But they are going to make life a bit tougher for those who want to do something positive.”

* * *

For Iran, the singular theme in negotiations with the six major powers is respect. “Respect for Iran’s rights,” as Zarif put it, is a euphemism for the right to enrich uranium, a process that can be used both for peaceful nuclear energy and for weapons. Tehran believes that enrichment is necessary for building alternative energy sources. Within a generation, because of soaring domestic oil consumption, Iran could run out of oil for export—the country’s main source of revenue. Iran also wants to restore Persia’s historic standing in the annals of science, and it sees nuclear energy as crucial to modern development. It feels the West wants to block any such advancement.

“Nuclear talks are not about nuclear capability.” Zarif told me. “They are about Iranian integrity and dignity.” He went on, “If the other side understands the importance of dignity and integrity to the Iranian people, and grasps the fact that various Iranians—who may never have seen [facilities at] Natanz or Arak or Fordo—believe that dignity is not up for sale, that their technology and development is not up for sale … then they will be able to reach an understanding with us.”

* * *

Iran’s nuclear debate is technically the domain of the Supreme National Security Council, which advises Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. He will have the last word. But there is a smaller committee—including Iran’s new President, Hassan Rouhani—that has worked out specific terms for the nuclear talks.

“It’s a debate,” Zarif said of discussions within the Iranian government. “And debate is healthy, heated or otherwise. It’s a very, very serious subject and it has important implications, and that is why it is a difficult decision. And a lot of mistrust is there, of the West. So every step is taken, I hope, with a lot of prudence, and consideration.”

When I was in Tehran in March, I asked Zarif how much a nuclear deal depended on him. “I don’t know,” he said. An aide, sitting nearby, chimed in quickly, “Ninety per cent! The outcome depends ninety per cent on him.”

“I hope that’s not true,” Zarif said.

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President Rouhani is a striking change from his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, even in Iran’s controlled political environment—particularly when it comes to foreign policy.

“We have a different perspective of the world,” Zarif said of the stance that he and Rouhani have taken. “We don’t necessarily see the world in terms of black and white. We believe there is the possibility for engagement and interaction. We believe we do not necessarily need to agree with somebody to be able to talk to them or to engage with them or to reach an understanding.”

But, he went on, “at the end of the day, we are actually much more self-confident. So we believe we can negotiate and achieve our goals, because we have the ability to make our point logically and to convince our negotiating partners that they can have a deal with us.”

Even so, there is nothing to prevent the Islamic Republic from returning to hard-line positions. “The electorate can send us back home,” he said. “I retired at the early age of forty-seven”—when Ahmadinejad squeezed him out of the Foreign Service—“so I can retire again. And I think people have every right to make that choice.”

Zarif ascribed Ahmadinejad’s election as President, in 2005, to the West’s failure to respond to diplomatic outreach during the reform period under his predecessor, Mohammad Khatami. “Iran adopted an open, engaging policy,” Zarif said. But the West’s reaction was “based on illusions—and, unfortunately, a bunch of people sitting in the White House who had extremely limited knowledge and grasp of world realities. The reaction to this openness was arrogant, wishful, and delusional. And the Iranian people believed that their dignity had been compromised, that the openness of our administration had been confronted with hostility and excessive demands. So they elected someone diametrically opposed to that approach.”

A sense of victimization permeates Iranian thinking. “Every statement that comes out of Washington that is not respectful and is trying to intimidate the Iranian people—is trying to put pressure on the Iranian people—strikes that very, very sensitive chord in the Iranian psyche, and they immediately react,” Zarif said.

I mentioned that the anti-American rhetoric—notably, things I’d heard while attending a Friday-prayers service—was more provocative than anything said by Americans. From the women’s section, I heard shouts of “Death to America” three times. I asked Zarif why Iranians are not sensitive to the things that they want Americans to be sensitive about.

“We’re talking about something done by the public versus something by the President of the United States,” Zarif said, a reference to statements, made by both Obama and George W. Bush, that military strikes against Iran remain an option. “The people of Iran respond to intimidation and pressure negatively; almost they are allergic to it… . It produces resentment among the Iranian people, and the chanting that you see in the Friday prayers.”

He went on, “I assure you, these people are the same people who went out of their way after 9/11 presenting their condolences to the Americans, even walking in the streets with candles, commemorating and expressing their sympathy and unity of purpose, actually, with the Americans. And, in two consecutive weeks, there was no slogan [at Friday Prayers]. But what changed it? Statements by Don Rumsfeld and Condi Rice humiliating the Iranian people.”

America should have learned better over the past thirty-five years, Zarif said. Iranians “respond very positively to respect. Try it. It won’t kill you.”

Zarif told me, “There are two futures. One future will be greater conflict, greater tension, greater mistrust—basically, more of the same as we had in the past. But more of the same may not be easily manageable. And it may even get worse, and more dangerous. So that’s one option, which I hope will not be before us.”

I asked him if that outcome included another Middle East war. The United States and Israel have both warned that if diplomacy fails the military option remains on the table.

“I’m not that worried about war,” Zarif said. “Insecurity is the word I would use—insecurity and tension and conflict. I thought civilized people had abandoned wars.” But then he added, “Sometimes people don’t make rational decisions.”

The second, more hopeful future, he said, is one in which, despite differences, the world powers “can work together on serious issues of mutual concern and try to address them. And these issues include problems of instability, extremism, and terrorism in the Middle East and Afghanistan, and a whole range of other possibilities, including Iran being a reliable source of energy for Europe.”

* * *

For decades, Iran was one of two pillars of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Israel was the other. I asked Zarif if the United States and Iran had any common interests thirty-five years after their diplomatic split.

“Did I say there were common interests?” Zarif, who is known for his wry humor, replied. “Iran has a national-security interest in nonproliferation, so, if the United States is interested in nonproliferation, that is one issue. Iran has a national-security interest in freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. We have a national-security interest in stability in this region. We have a national-security interest in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, instability in Afghanistan.” He continued, “We have a national-security interest in stability and in maintaining stable governments in the region. We have a national-security interest in in putting an end to the bloodshed in Syria.” In sum, he said, “If I take what the United States says at face value, there should be convergence.”

* * *

Javad Zarif on Iran's Nuclear Negotiations, via Campaign  Against Sanctions and Military Intervention in Iran, May 23, 2014

Wednesday, April 23, 2014

What Iran Wants

Iranian Foreign Minister  Mohammad Javad Zarif contributed this essay to the May/June 2014 issue of Foreign Affairs: "What Iran Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era."

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Foreign policy is a critical component in the lives, conduct, and governance of all nation-states. But it has become even more significant in recent years as interstate relations have grown ever more complex. The inexorable rise in the number of international players -- including multilateral organizations, nonstate actors, and even individuals -- has further complicated policymaking.

Meanwhile, the ongoing process of globalization -- however conceived and defined, whether lauded or despised -- has brought its inescapable weight to bear on the foreign policies of all states, whether large or small, developed or developing.

Since its establishment by a popular revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has grappled with these challenges. The postrevolutionary foreign policy of Iran has been based on a number of cherished ideals and objectives embedded in the country’s constitution. These include the preservation of Iran’s independence, territorial integrity, and national security and the achievement of long-term, sustainable national development. Beyond its borders, Iran seeks to enhance its regional and global stature; to promote its ideals, including Islamic democracy; to expand its bilateral and multilateral relations, particularly with neighboring Muslim-majority countries and nonaligned states; to reduce tensions and manage disagreements with other states; to foster peace and security at both the regional and the international levels through positive engagement; and to promote international understanding through dialogue and cultural interaction.

IRAN IN THE MULTILATERAL ERA

Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar world in the early 1990s, the global order has undergone a major structural transformation. But a firm new order has not yet emerged. As was the case during other transitions in the past, the fluid, complex, and uncertain state of international affairs today is extremely perilous and challenging. Previous transitions were usually complicated by military rivalries and even outright war among the dominant powers of the time. Today’s rivalries are similarly quite intense. However, due to a number of factors -- the substantially changed global environment, changes in the nature of power, and the diversity and multiplicity of state and nonstate actors -- competition these days mostly takes a nonmilitary form.
The concept of power itself, traditionally measured in terms of military might, has changed substantially. New forms of influence -- economic, technological, and cultural -- have emerged. Concurrently, changes at the conceptual level have brought the cultural, normative, and ideational components of power to the fore, making power more accessible to a larger pool of actors. Moreover, the gradual rise of multilateralism in the wake of World War II has elevated the importance of international norms and consensus.

Despite such substantial changes in the architecture of the world order, remnants and beneficiaries of the old order have tried to salvage the wreckage of the past. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the emergence in the United States of apocalyptic theories declaring “the end of history” or a “clash of civilizations” represented a hasty reaction to the enemy vacuum created by the end of the Cold War and to the rising status of Muslims on the global stage. Through a series of subsequent Islamophobic campaigns -- sometimes promoted as official state policy and perpetuated systematically in various forms and guises -- some in the West tried to depict the Islamic community as a new ideological enemy on a global scale.

But rather than experiencing a divergence, the world is now moving toward a state of mutual interdependence. Contrary to the situation in the past, the pursuit of go-it-alone policies by former hegemons or current powers has led to a state of impasse and paralysis. Today, most nation-states, regardless of their size, power, influence, or other attributes, have come to realize that isolationism, whether voluntary or imposed, is neither a virtue nor an advantage. Collective action and cooperation have become the hallmarks of the era.

Multilateralism, the collective search for common solutions to common problems, has proved its desirability and practical efficacy at both the regional and the global levels. Even major world powers have learned the hard way that they can no longer pursue their interests or achieve their particular goals unilaterally. The gradual yet growing trend of coalition-making, at the regional and global levels, both for short-term purposes and for more enduring enterprises, bears witness to the inescapability of collective action. Willful cooperation has gradually developed as a new working pattern of interaction among states; it has come to replace the once predominant and now discredited pattern of confrontation, unconditional subservience, and perpetual rivalry.

As an inevitable consequence of globalization and the ensuing rise of collective action and cooperative approaches, the idea of seeking or imposing zero-sum games has lost its luster. Still, some actors cling to their old habits and habitually pursue their own interests at the expense of others. The insistence of some major powers on playing zero-sum games with win-lose outcomes has usually led to lose-lose outcomes for all the players involved.

The much-challenged position of the United States in the world today, notwithstanding its preponderance of military power, is a glaring case in point. The actual situation in various parts of the world where the United States is directly involved, most notably in the greater Middle East and in Iran’s immediate neighborhood, points to Washington’s reluctant but unmistakable turn to the path of coalition building with other global powers and even regional actors. China, India, and Russia are engaged in intense competition, primarily with the Western bloc, in a concerted effort to secure more prominent global roles. However, major powers and emerging powers alike are now loath to use military means to resolve rivalries, differences, or even disputes.

This has led to the gradual rise of a revisionist approach to foreign policy. Nation-states, regardless of their current position and power, now seek to enhance their stature and achieve their goals through a carefully balanced combination of cooperation and competition. The deadly rivalries of the past, a function of brute force and hard power, have gradually given way to cultural, normative, and ideational forms of competition. The uncertainty produced by the current transition in global norms and behavior also has a downside. If states miscalculate their own power or misperceive the capabilities and intentions of others, it could prove extremely costly to all involved. The intrinsic riskiness of this state of affairs calls for governments to rely on more objective analysis and to make careful assessments of their own positions and capabilities as well as of the intentions and possible conduct of others.

All states can take advantage of this transitional stage to advance their positions and further their interests. Governments must make realistic calculations about their own relative advantages and vulnerabilities and, most important, articulate clear sets of objectives and plans. Over the past few decades, especially since the end of the Cold War, states that have pursued clearly articulated foreign policies have been the most successful in advancing their regional and global positions; those that have lacked an understanding of the global environment and pursued policies based on miscalculations and misjudgments have either lost their previous positions or become marginalized.

FULFILLING IRAN’S POTENTIAL

As a solid regional power in this era of intense transition in global politics, Iran stands in a unique position. Given its large landmass and unique geographic position along the east–west transit route, Iran, since antiquity, has enjoyed a preeminent position in its region and beyond. Although Iran’s civilization and cultural heritage have remained intact, its political and economic fortunes have fluctuated periodically, depending on, among other things, its governance at home and its relations with the outside world. The victory of the 1979 revolution, a popular, nationwide, antimonarchical uprising with a mixture of republican and Islamic traits, contributed to the establishment of a new revolutionary order in the country. The repercussions were drastic, and the revolution deeply affected the country’s foreign relations, not only in its immediate neighborhood but also throughout the greater Middle East and in the rest of the world.

Any objective analysis of Iran’s unique attributes within the larger context of its tumultuous region would reveal the country’s significant potential for a prominent regional and global role. The Islamic Republic can actively contribute to the restoration of regional peace, security, and stability and play a catalytic role during this current transitional stage in international relations. In light of the increasing importance of normative and ideational factors in global politics, the Islamic Republic is well suited to draw on the rich millennial heritage of Iranian society and culture and the significant heritage of the Islamic Revolution, particularly its indigenously derived and sustained participatory model of governance. Iran can use such strengths to help realize the deeply cherished national aspirations of the Iranian people, including the achievement of long-term development and regional ascendance commensurate with the country’s inherent capacities and stature.

Iran also benefits from a number of historical characteristics that could be considered unique sources of opportunity, many of which have not been properly or fully leveraged in the past. For example, Iran has remained independent from outside powers and practiced genuine nonalignment, lending it a particular freedom of action within the existing global order. Iran can also leverage its political traditions. It has successfully established an indigenous democratic model of governance, developing and maintaining a rare religious democracy in the modern world. It has an unmatched cultural identity emanating from its dynamic blend of Iranian and Islamic culture, which it can use to promote its mission and message throughout the entire Islamic world. As an ancient society with a plurality of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, Iran also offers a model for political inclusion. And the country has achieved all of this at the center of a vital geostrategic region that has witnessed a long history of major-power rivalries, interventions of all sorts, and protracted military conflicts. Finally, Iran has also demonstrated its potent ideational capabilities and universal reach through such initiatives as President Muhammad Khatami’s “Dialogue Among Civilizations” and President Hassan Rouhani’s recent proposal for a “world against violence and extremism,” which was adopted as a resolution by the UN General Assembly last December.

Governance in the modern world is challenging for every state, regardless of its size, demographics, form of government, geographic position, level of development, or relations with the world. Iran has been an organized state since antiquity, albeit with some periods of interruption. It has thus had extensive relations throughout history, in war and in peace, with its numerous neighbors and with other contending powers. It has accumulated a rich, layered collective memory and a deep reservoir of experiences. Iran borders seven countries and shares access to either the Caspian Sea or the Persian Gulf with 11 countries; both bodies of water are of interest to the littoral states as well as to a host of outside powers. Thus, Iran inevitably has a full plate to deal with when it comes to its national security and foreign relations.

Iran also finds itself in a fundamentally crisis-ridden region. The decades-long occupation of Palestine and the ongoing conflict there has taken a destructive toll on the well-being and development of the entire Middle East. The chronic turmoil, instability, and violence in the region have grown worse in recent years due to a series of protracted external military interventions, most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since early 2011, political upheavals in the Arab world and their generally bloody aftermaths -- dubbed by some during their initial stages as “the Arab Spring” and by others as “the Islamic Awakening” -- have introduced another destabilizing factor to the region. The trend appears likely to continue for quite some time, even though the direction of the process remains extremely uncertain.

Given this overall regional picture and the dynamics at work between local and external players -- most prominently the United States -- Iran today has to grapple with a number of major challenges in its external relations. Needless to say, the long shadow of the decades-old and still ongoing tussle between Iran and the United States, which has been much exacerbated as a result of the nuclear imbroglio, has further complicated the state of relations between Iran and a host of its neighbors. Meanwhile, there has been a recent surge in the activities of extremist and violent nonstate actors in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, with a clear and unmistakable anti-Iran, anti-Shiite platform. A well-orchestrated campaign has promoted Islamophobia, Iranophobia, and Shiite-phobia and depicted Iran as a threat to regional peace and security; extended support to anti-Iran claimants in the region; tarnished Iran’s global image and undermined its stature; armed Iran’s regional rivals; actively supported anti-Iran forces, including the Taliban and other extremist groups; and fomented disagreements between Iran and its neighbors.

MODERATION AND HOPE

It was within this international context that Rouhani won a decisive victory in the heavily contested Iranian presidential election in June 2013. He won 51 percent of all the votes cast in the first round against five conservative rivals. His political platform of prudent moderation and hope represented a significant turning point in Iranian politics. The fact that voter turnout reached 73 percent suggests that the public had moved past the lingering divisions of the June 2009 election.

Rouhani’s pragmatic positions on foreign and domestic issues proved reassuring to the Iranian electorate. Rouhani distinguished his campaign from the murky platforms of his rivals in several key respects: his clear analysis of Iran’s current situation, his lucid and unambiguous articulation of the major challenges facing society and the state, and his honest and straightforward approach to problems and possible solutions. In this way, Rouhani managed to mobilize the disenchanted segments of the population to take an active interest in the final days of the campaign and to participate in the national vote.

Rouhani’s foreign policy platform was based on a principled, sober, and wise critique of the conduct of foreign relations during the preceding eight years under the previous administration. Rouhani promised to remedy the unacceptable state of affairs through a major overhaul of the country’s foreign policy. The changes he proposed demonstrated a realistic understanding of the contemporary international order, the current external challenges facing the Islamic Republic, and what it will take to restore Iran’s relations with the world to a state of normalcy. Rouhani also called for a discourse of “prudent moderation.” This vision aims to move Iran away from confrontation and toward dialogue, constructive interaction, and understanding, all with an eye to safeguarding national security, elevating the stature of Iran, and achieving long-term comprehensive development.

Prudent moderation is an approach based on realism, self­-confidence, realistic idealism, and constructive engagement. Realism requires an understanding of the nature, structure, mechanisms, and power dynamics of the international system and of the potential and limits of its institutions. 
Rouhani’s moderation brings together a profound conviction in the cherished ideals of the Islamic Revolution with an objective evaluation of Iran’s actual capacities, capabilities, and constraints. It demands a deliberate aversion to actions that are insulting, condescending, or self-aggrandizing. It promotes self-confidence based on an understanding of Iran’s material and moral resources, including the collective wisdom of its citizenry. It values accountability, transparency, and honesty in dealing with the populace and implies a willingness to reform and improve existing policies. Rouhani’s approach entails a delicate balancing act: between national, regional, and global needs, on the one hand, and the available means, instruments, and policies, on the other; between persistence and flexibility in foreign policy; between goals and means; and among various instruments of power in a dynamically changing world. Finally, Rouhani’s commitment to constructive engagement requires dialogue and interaction with other nations on an equal footing, with mutual respect, and in the service of shared interests. It requires that all participants make serious efforts to reduce tensions, build confidence, and achieve détente.

A WAY FORWARD

Guided by this conceptual framework, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic under the current administration will be based on achieving understanding and consensus at the national level and constructive engagement and effective cooperation with the outside world. Iran’s policies will be guided by the principles of dignity, rationality, and prudence. This overall strategy aims to safeguard and strengthen Iran’s national security, diffuse or eliminate external threats, combat Islamophobia and Iranophobia, elevate the country’s stature, and achieve comprehensive development.

With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs serving as the central organ for planning and executing Iran’s foreign policy, in close coordination with other government bodies, the Islamic Republic will pursue several key goals moving forward. First, Iran will expand and deepen its bilateral and multilateral relations through meaningful engagement with a wide range of states and organizations, including international economic institutions. Multilateralism will play a central role in Iran’s external relations.

That will involve active contributions to global norm-setting and assertive participation in coalitions of like-minded states to promote peace and stability. A second priority will be to defend the individual and collective rights of Iranian nationals everywhere and to promote Iranian-Islamic culture, the Persian language, Islamic values, and Islamic democracy as a form of governance. Third, Iran will continue to support the cause of oppressed people across the world, especially in Palestine, and will continue its principled rejection of Zionist encroachments in the Muslim world.

Given the pressing challenges that it faces today, Iran will also focus on a number of more urgent aims. The top priority is to diffuse and ultimately defeat the international anti-Iranian campaign, spearheaded by Israel and its American benefactors, who seek to “securitize” Iran -- that is, to delegitimize the Islamic Republic by portraying it as a threat to the global order. The main vehicle for this campaign is the “crisis” over Iran’s peaceful nuclear program -- a crisis that, in Iran’s view, is wholly manufactured and therefore reversible. That is why Rouhani wasted no time in breaking the impasse and engaging in negotiations with the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany) to find common ground and reach an agreement that will ensure nonproliferation, preserve Iran’s scientific accomplishments, honor Iran’s inalienable national rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and end the unjust sanctions that have been imposed by outside powers.

Iran has no interest in nuclear weapons and is convinced that such weapons would not enhance its security. Iran does not have the means to engage in nuclear deterrence -- directly or through proxies -- against its adversaries. Furthermore, the Iranian government believes that even a perception that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons is detrimental to the country’s security and to its regional role, since attempts by Iran to gain strategic superiority in the Persian Gulf would inevitably provoke responses that would diminish Iran’s conventional military advantage.

Therefore, the ongoing negotiations over the nuclear issue face no insurmountable barriers. The only requirements are political will and good faith for the negotiators to “get to yes” and achieve the objective established by the Joint Plan of Action adopted in Geneva last November, which states, “The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear programme will be exclusively peaceful.” The unexpectedly fast pace of progress in the negotiations so far augurs well for a speedy resolution of this unnecessary crisis and for the opening up of new diplomatic horizons.

Iran will also endeavor to diffuse external threats by resolving outstanding issues with the rest of the world, in particular with its immediate neighbors. Confidence building and cooperation will be the cornerstones of Iran’s regional policy. That is why last year, Iran proposed the creation of a security and cooperation arrangement in the Persian Gulf area. As a responsible regional power, Iran will actively participate in combating and containing extremism and violence through bilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation with countries in the region and beyond.

Moreover, Iran will prudently manage its relations with the United States by containing existing disagreements and preventing further tensions from emerging unnecessarily, thereby gradually easing tensions. Iran will also engage with European countries and other Western states with the goal of reinvigorating and further expanding relations. This normalization process must be based on the principles of mutual respect and mutual interest, and it must address issues of legitimate concern to both sides. Iran will also expand and consolidate its amicable ties with other major powers, such as China, India, and Russia. As the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement until 2015, Iran will reach out to emerging powers of the “global South” and will try to responsibly mobilize their enormous potential for contributing to global peace and prosperity.

The Iranian people, with their massive turnout in last year’s presidential election and their decisive choice of assertive engagement, have provided a unique window of opportunity for the new Iranian government and for the world to chart a different and much more promising course in our bilateral and multilateral relations. The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to vigorously honor its citizens’ choice, which will undoubtedly have a tremendous impact on world affairs.

For this endeavor to succeed, it is imperative for other states to accept the reality of Iran’s prominent role in the Middle East and beyond and to recognize and respect Iran’s legitimate national rights, interests, and security concerns. It is equally important for other states to scrupulously observe the sensitivities of the Iranian nation, particularly regarding its national dignity, independence, and achievements. Westerners, especially Americans, need to modify their understandings of Iran and the Middle East and develop a better grasp of the region’s realities, avoiding the analytic and practical mistakes of the past. Courage and leadership are required to seize this historic opportunity, which might not come again. The opportunity must not be lost.

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