The following are
excerpts, translated by MEMRI, from an interview with the leader of Hizbullah,
Hassan Nasrallah. The interview was conducted on August 14-15 by the Lebanese
daily Al-Akhbar.
* * *
"The most severe problem we
are dealing with now in terms of the atmosphere in the Arab and regional arena
is that we are approaching a phase in which the peoples of the region see
Israel's existence as natural and not a threat to them. [They think that,] if
Israel is a problem, then it is the problem of the Palestinian people, not of
the peoples of the region. This relates to politics, security, and economics.
"First of all, Israel is an
illegal entity and constitutes a perpetual... threat to the entire region.
[Since] we cannot coexist with this threat, the end of this nation must be its
annihilation, unconnected to all the problems and the sensitivities, of
everything that has happened or will happen between Palestinians and
non-Palestinians, between Sunnis and Shi'ites, or between Muslims and
Christians. All the conflicts, sensitivities, schisms, and struggles must not
neutralize the culture that considers Israel a cancerous growth, absolute evil,
and a danger to all peoples and governments in this region, and to their honor
and their holy places. The final goal must be its annihilation. . . .
"From the point of view of
[religious] faith, [Israel] is a matter that cannot even be discussed. When it
comes to the [religious] faith, the [extent to which] public debate that is
impacted by mood and emotion is more limited. [Since] the people stress that
their opinion on Israel stems from [religious] belief, this position has
nothing to do with the question of whether we and the Palestinians are
reconciled or divided. . ."
"I don't think that there is
any [weapon] that Hizbullah has prepared, hidden, or concealed [for use] in a
confrontation with Israel and was exposed [in Syria]. The [Syria] campaign
gives us experience, knowledge, and wide horizons, that can be used more
optimally in any future conflict with the enemy, whether defensive or
offensive... Israel is monitoring Hizbullah's experience in Syria. After
[Hiabullah] gained experience [in its fighting against armed Syrian groups] in
Al-Qusayr and Al-Qalamoun, Israelis asked many times whether Hizbullah could
implement the lessons and knowledge it had gained from this experience in a
[future] campaign against the Galilee. On occasion, the Syria campaign gives us
additional qualitative advantages [that could help us] in any conflict with the
Israeli enemy. We have overlooked nothing that could benefit us in fighting the
enemy."
"Throughout the [2006] war,
weapons transfers from Syria were not stopped. It was not clear how long the
war would last. Therefore, the more options we had, and the more weapons and
ammunition, the better the situation would be. Although Israel attacked nearly
all the [border] crossings [between Syria and Lebanon], it was still possible
to transfer weapons. . .
"It was a reasonable
possibility that the war would spread to Syria, because Israel placed part of
the responsibility for the steadfastness of the resistance [i.e. Hizbullah] on
Syria, as well as [responsibility] for arming it with some of the weapons that
had a significant impact on the course of the war. Therefore, this possibility
was reasonable due to developments on the ground, especially when talk began of
an [Israeli] ground incursion towards
Hasbaya, Rashaya, and the western and central Beqaa [areas in northern and
northeastern Lebanon]. Then, around the second week of the aggression, Brig.
Assef Shawkat [deputy defense minister and brother-in-law of Syrian President
Bashar Al-Assad], who maintained contact with us throughout the war, asked my
opinion on an idea examined in Damascus – the possibility that Syria would have
to enter [the war] on the side of the resistance [i.e. Hizbullah] in the event
of a wide-scale [Israeli] ground incursion. I am not saying that such a
decision was made, but it was proposed to the president [Assad] and to the
relevant group of decision-makers. They monitored every move, and were updated
on everything that was happening. After consulting with the brothers [i.e.
Hizbullah], I answered [the Syrians]: You are not obligated to do this; the
situation here is not so bad, and our ability to handle a ground [operation] is
very good. On the contrary, we hope Israel does launch a ground incursion,
because then the characteristics of the campaign would be clear. In effect, [a
wide-scale Israeli] ground incursion, which might have prompted Syria to enter
the war, did not take place, so the idea was scrapped, and there was no
discussion afterwards [on this issue]." . . .
"In principle, the decision to capture
the Israeli soldiers [in 2006] was made by Hizbullah's Shura Council several
months before the operation. Under our modus operandi, when the Shura Council
makes a decision such as this, [responsibility for] its administration and its
execution are transferred to the Jihad Council, which is headed by the
secretary-general in accordance with the Hizbullah charter. This council is
made up of a group of central jihadi commanders.
"On the execution level [of
such a decision], the matter is discussed by the Jihad Council from several
aspects, such as the appropriate location for a successful operation, timing,
tactics, the battle plan and how it is to be administered, the participants,
[Israel's] possible responses, and precautions that must be taken. All these
are usually discussed by the Jihad Council, and decisions are made unanimously
or nearly unanimously – that is, not by a vote.
"[Even] after the selection of
a location, participant groups, and a course of action, this [operation] was
not simple and took months to carry out. More than once, the brothers
infiltrated the area and even the land of occupied Palestine, conducting
lengthy ambushes, withdrawing from and then returning [to Israel], and waiting
for a suitable opportunity. Sometimes targets appeared but it was unclear
whether they were civilian or military. We stressed that we must capture
soldiers, not settlers, so that they cannot later say that we kidnapped
civilians. . .
"It is the secretary-general
who decides on [how] the jihad operation will be run, but he of course does not
directly manage the jihad units, the fighters in the field... The jihad
commanders – or those whom we call the jihadi aides – are in charge [of them].
They, together with the secretary-general, monitor the operation; he is aware
of the Shura [Council's] decision-making policy – to some extent, he serves as
its proxy, [as he is] updated on the status of the jihad, on the possible
options, and on the political situation. For this reason, the secretary-general
is the decision-making factor, sometimes also on matters relating to the field,
while consulting with, and sometimes on the consent of, the Jihad Council
members. For instance, on the decision to strike areas within occupied
Palestine – it is not [the commanders] in the field who decide where to attack.
This is a decision we [in the Jihad Council] make.
"When a decision is made, the
jihadi officials monitor its execution and coordinate among [fighting] units,
intelligence elements, and the [units] firing artillery and rockets. That is,
if we say we entered the stage of [attacking] Haifa, it refers to a decision
[that has been made]. The type of weapons to be used [require] that a decision
[be made]. Targeting a Sa'ar 5 [Israeli Navy Corvette requires] a decision.[1]
Decisions such as this are made by the Jihad Council and the secretary-general,
since he heads the council, and in consultation with and while reaching
understandings with the brothers... Every step has its own considerations. For
instance, targeting a Sa'ar 5 means that it was decided to attack a quality
target, [and that] has many consequences. Additionally, when we use a
particular weapon for the first time, it means that the Jihad Council has
decided to unveil a weapon that no one knew we had. After the decision is made,
the discussion becomes technical, professional, and executive. I have nothing
to do with that, and I don't intervene. . .
"Another example relates to
targeting Tel Aviv. This is not a procedural matter, but a significant
decision. When the Dahiyeh and other cities in the south and the Beqaa [Valley]
were attacked, there was a serious discussion on whether to target Tel Aviv at
that time. The result of the discussion is that we created a new equation: Tel
Aviv-Beirut. Since the Dahiyeh and other areas came under heavy attack in any
case, we said, Let's create a new equation by means of which we will defend
Beirut or [at the very least] participate in defending it."
In
response to another question, Nasrallah stressed that he was part of the
decision-making process in the Shura Council, but made no decisions on his own:
"The Hizbullah
secretary-general is not the commander of Hizbullah and is not the
decision-maker in Hizbullah. In principle, political decisions are made by the
Shura [Council]. It is the Shura [Council] that sets out the processes and
formulates the positions and principled decisions. Of course, the
secretary-general is an influential partner in the decision-making, but he is
not the one who makes the decisions... For instance, the decision to enter the
battle of Qusayr [in Syria] was made by the Shura [Council], not the
secretary-general. Even the decision to announce [the decision to do so] was
made by the Shura [Council]. All that remains for me is to [decide] how to
express this position..."
While
implicitly acknowledging that Hamas's relationship with Hizbullah and Iran is
strained, Nasrallah stressed that the ties with Hamas were never severed. In
the context of the current fighting in Gaza, he criticized Turkey for trying to
aid the Palestinians without cooperating with Egypt, emphasizing that anyone
who wishes to help them must do so only via the Egyptian channel.
In
response to the question whether the Palestinians had asked Hizbullah to
directly intervene in the recent fighting in Gaza, Nasrallah said:
"[Hamas senior official]
brother Moussa Abu Marzouq talked about this.[2] No one from the [other]
factions spoke to us about this... If such a demand is serious, it will be
discussed in private circles, not in the media. The lines of communications
between us and Hamas were never severed, even when there was talk of a strained
relationship. Communication is ongoing. [Abu Marzouq] or another Hamas leaders
could ask to discuss this matter, but to raise it by means of the media – this
is inappropriate and surprising...
"Gaza is situated between two
problems: the problem of trust with Israel – which is fundamental and essential
– and the problem of being between two axes – the Qatar-Turkey axis and the
Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE axis... We, for example, have consulted with our friends
in the Palestinian factions and with our Iranian friends. I proposed that the
Iranians contact the Turks, the Egyptians, and the Saudis, even with the
mediation of the UAE or Oman. As for the resistance axis, we do not seek to
score points or to use the resistance movement to promote internal or regional
considerations...
"Turkish Prime Minister Recep
[Tayyip] Erdogan launched a personal attack on Egyptian President 'Abd
Al-Fattah Al-Sisi. Even Qatar, [via] Al-Jazeera [TV], expressed a negative
opinion of Egypt. Those who want to provide aid to Gaza should talk to Egypt.
The Palestinians themselves say that any solution or arrangement would be
impossible without Egypt. This requires both these axes – between which Gaza
falls no matter what – to prioritize Gaza above other disagreements or
conflicts, and so far this hasn't happened as it should have...
"Naturally, our situation is
impacted by the events in Syria, Iraq, and the region. In the Syrian issue, in
all our meetings there was a call for us to understand their [Hamas'] position
and for them to understand ours, even if we disagreed in our assessments of the
situation. There were serious debates between us on this matter. Obviously, the
Gaza issue revives the need to prioritize it, so that we can maintain closer
ties and closer cooperation. Of course this will have an encouraging effect on
Hizbullah's relations with Hamas and with Hamas' relations with the Islamic
Republic [of Iran]. The Syria issue is different and complex, and [more] time
[is required to deal with it]..."
Asked
whether Hizbullah is responsible for all Shi'ite Arabs, Nasrallah said that
some Arab elements like to present it that way, but that, fundamentally, the
organization's activity is not motivated by sectarian considerations. At the
same time, Nasrallah himself used sectarian terms in describing his
organization's activities in Iraq. He said:
"There has always been someone
to ensure that we would be defined that way [i.e., as responsible for all Shi'ites. But] Hizbullah has always been a
national project as well as a regional [factor] in resisting Israel, and has
made substantial achievements and marked tremendous victories in that
campaign..."
He added: "When Hizbullah
provides aid in any arena, its considerations are nonsectarian. They are a part
of what we call the ummah campaign, the ummah enterprise, and the interests of
our [Arab] homelands and peoples. For instance, when the Americans occupied
Iraq [in 2003] the popular atmosphere mostly did not support the resistance,
because of the Iraqi people's oppression at the hands of Saddam Hussein,
because of the constant wars, and because of the siege [on Iraq].
"This was natural, since the
people were weary... Hizbullah chose to operate [in Iraq] not in accordance with
the Shi'ite attitude, but in order to influence it, and to influence any
[element], however minor, [to promote] resistance to the American occupier in
Iraq. When the resistance [to the American occupation] in Iraq began, it was
largely a 'Shi'ite resistance' – that is, the factions that carried out
resistance operations comprised Iraqi Shi'ites.
"Many operations were
documented on video, but the [Qatari] TV channel Al-Jazeera and the [Saudi
channel] Al-Arabiya refused to air them. Isn't that strange? Why? Because they
did not want to recognize Shi'ite resistance as part of the Iraqi resistance.
This is not an accusation against Sunnis, but only against a few regimes.From
the start, [those regimes] used sectarian incitement on the issues of Iraq,
Syria, and Lebanon. It just so happens that those situated along the border
with the enemy entity are Shi'ites. That is why it was they who fought it. But
[those regimes] insist on calling it an Iranian Shi'ite resistance, and so on.
"We adhere to our claim that our
presence in Syria is nonsectarian, and the same goes for the resistance in
Iraq. [The proof is] that we also helped Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and [other]
Palestinian factions, which are [all] Sunni."
Endnotes:
[1] Likely referring to the Hizbullah attack
on the Sa'ar 5-Class INS Hanit during the Second Lebanon War.
[2] Abu Marzouq said in a July 29,
2014 interview with the Russian news agency RIA Novosti: "We hope that the
Lebanese front will open up, and together we will fight against [Israel].
There’s no arguing that Lebanese resistance could mean a lot." Ria.ru,
July 29, 2014.
* * *
“Hassan Nasrallah In
Interview with ‘Al-Akhbar’: Israel An Illegitimate Entity, Must Be Eliminated,”
MEMRI, August 24, 2014 (Dispatch No. 5825)
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