Netanyahu on July 4: Shared Values, Common Interests

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, on July 3, gave the following remarks at the US Embassy Fourth of July celebration. He notes: "In the huge land mass from Gibraltar to the Khyber Pass, the United States shares values only with Israel." 

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I came here directly from security consultations in the Government Compound in Tel Aviv. Over the past several weeks, we have been determinedly fighting Hamas terrorism, and Hamas has already paid a heavy price – in Judea and Samaria we have arrested hundreds of Hamas activists, we shut down nearly all of its institutions and we did many other things. In Gaza over the past several days, we hit dozens of Hamas activists and destroyed outposts and facilities that served Hamas terrorists.

Now we are preparing for two possibilities in the south: The first is that the firing at our communities will stop and then our operations will stop as well and the quiet that prevailed in the south after Operation Pillar of Defense will continue.  The second possibility is that the firing at our communities in the south will continue and then the reinforcement forces that are located in the field will act forcefully. The security of our citizens comes first.

On behalf of the citizens of Israel, I would like to praise the residents of the south. The strength you are demonstrating allows us to act determinedly and responsibly towards one goal – your security, all our security.

Over the past several weeks, we have endured the kidnapping and horrifying murder of the three boys who won over our hearts and whose families have captured our hearts – what wonderful families. We will pursue all those who had a part in the murders of Gilad, Eyal and Naftali and we will catch them. We will continue to fight terrorism as we have fought it since the establishment of the country.

Our security forces continue to investigate the background to the shocking murder of the boy whose body was found in the Jerusalem Forest. Whatever the motive may be – this murder must be strongly condemned and we will bring those responsible for this crime to justice.

I appeal to all the citizens of Israel and ask you: Please exercise restraint in your actions and words. Our hearts ache, our blood boils, but we must remember that we are, first and foremost, human beings and we are citizens of a law-abiding country. We are making decisions in a responsible, cool-headed and considered manner. The American people, who experienced terrible terrorist attacks on its own soil, empathizes with our fight and we empathize with their fight."

July 4th has always been a great celebration for all those who cherish America's historic commitment to liberty. For me it resonates in a special way because I lost my brother at the rescue mission at Entebbe on July 4th, 1976, and since that date, July 4th has always been a special mixture of pain and pride – pride because this is a day in which the celebration of freedom and the fight against terrorism are intertwined. Today our two nations, America and Israel, stand together in celebrating freedom and stand together in confronting terrorism.

What is the secret of the special relationship between the United States and Israel? The answer can be summarized in four words: Shared values, common interests. Shared values because the United States and Israel were both founded on the principles of liberty, democracy and freedom. In both our lands, the rights of the individual are sacred and the foremost right, without which the others cannot exist, is the right to live.

And that is why we pursued the murderers of Gilad, Eyal and Naftali. They denied them that basic right in such a cruel way. And that is why I unequivocally condemn the murder of a Palestinian youth in Jerusalem a few days ago. The police investigation is ongoing. We don't know yet the motives or the identities of the perpetrators but we will. We will bring to justice the criminals responsible for this despicable crime, whoever they may be. Murder, riots, incitement, vigilantism – they have no place in our democracy.

And it is these democratic values that differentiate us from our neighbors and unite us with the United States. These are shared values but in today's Middle East, we are united also by common interests because we face common threats of terror and upheaval from those who despise our values. The US and Israel are working together to roll back the tide of terror and defeat its evil forces.

I want to thank President Obama for his words of deep sympathy and support following the brutal murders of Eyal, Gilad and Naftali. Naftali was also an American citizen.

My friends, the United States has other partners in the region and these partnerships, these relationships are important, both for the United States and for Israel. But those partnerships are based on interests. In the huge land mass from Gibraltar to the Khyber Pass, the United States shares values only with Israel. And this is what makes the bond we share so unique and so unbreakable. When America celebrates its independence, Israel celebrates with America. The people of Israel are unabashedly pro-American and the American people are unabashedly pro-Israel. And by the way, that support keeps going up and up and up each year, tremendous support for Israel in America and I can tell you – Ambassador, you can relay this in a cable – tremendous support for America in Israel.

That's not obvious in our region because we share the values. We understand what America is about. And that friendship is essential as we move forward to face the great challenges before us: Denying Iran nuclear capability, stemming the tide of radicalism in Syria and Iraq and elsewhere and building peace and stability with our neighbors.

So on behalf of the Government and people of Israel, I thank President Obama and his Administration. I thank the US Congress and the great American people. And I thank you, Ambassador Shapiro. I thank you all for your great friendship and your unfaltering support.

Happy Independence Day, America. God bless Israel and God bless America.

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PM Netanyahu's Remarks, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

Dueling Op-Eds on Iran

As the Iran nuclear talks approach a deadline on July 20, US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif have each contributed op-eds on the crisis. Kerry's appeared in The Washington Post; Zarif's in Le Monde. The Iran Primer of the US Institute of Peace has the transcripts as well as a link to Zarif's five minute video message.

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Transcript of video message "We Can Make History"

 

            In the next three weeks, we have a unique opportunity to make history: To forge a comprehensive agreement over Iran's nuclear energy program; and to end an unnecessary crisis that has distracted us from addressing together our common challenges, such as the horrifying events of past few weeks in Iraq.

 

            We could have resolved the nuclear issue in 2005. But then, people didn't believe me when I said that Iranians are allergic to pressure.

 

            The Bush administration torpedoed the deal by demanding that we abandon enrichment, altogether. They then opted for pressure and sanctions. For 8 years.

 

            The sanctions were crippling -- even deadly; literally.

 

            Iranian cancer patients could not buy medicine with their own money, because banks around the world had been bullied by the US Treasury to avoid transferring Iranian funds.

 

            But sanctions did not cripple our nuclear program.

 

            Neither did the murder of our nuclear scientists, the sabotage of our nuclear facilities - with potentially disastrous environmental ramifications - or the repeated military threats.

In fact, they achieved exactly the opposite:

 

            Insisting on no enrichment resulted in a 100-fold increase in our centrifuges: from less than 200 to almost 20,000;

 

            Refusing to sell fuel for our American-built research reactor, forced us to produce our own fuel by increasing enrichment levels: from 3.5% to 20%.

 

            Depriving Iranian cancer patients from medical radio-isotopes, compelled us to build a heavy water reactor, going from an idea then to a full-fledged plant, to be commissioned soon; and

 

            Threats to bomb our nuclear facilities out of existence, obliged us to build Fordow, which is protected by our mountains.

 

            Western governments cried foul, ignoring that they had brought this upon themselves.

 

            As we approach July 20th, I feel compelled to warn again that pursuing a game of chicken in an attempt to extract last minute concessions cannot achieve anything better than what it achieved in 2005.

 

            To those who continue to believe that sanctions brought Iran to the negotiating table, I can only say that pressure has been tried for the past 8 years, in fact for the past 35 years.

 

            It didn't bring the Iranian people to kneel in submission. And it will not now nor in the future. We still have time to exit this spiral of escalation.Try mutual respect. It works. We are trying to reach a deal. Not a good deal or a bad deal, but a doable and lasting deal. And any deal, by definition, is the outcome of mutual understanding—not imposition by one side or the other.

 

            We are willing to take concrete measures to guarantee that our nuclear program will always remain peaceful.

 

            We still have time to put an end to the myth that Iran is seeking to build a bomb. And we're backed by over 250 years of non-aggression to substantiate our assertion.

 

            My government remains committed to ending this unnecessary crisis by July 20th. I hope my counterparts are, too.

 

Excerpts from Foreign Miniser Zarif’s Op-ed in Le Monde

 

            Today we have got a unique opportunity for talks with the P5+1. But it is to regret that there are still some on the opposite side who would not stop dreaming.

 

            There is this political will to reach a comprehensive, long-term solution that is respected by both sides. But the negotiations can only become successful when the entire parties dedicate themselves to finding acceptable procedures which would be in agreement with the interim deal, that is, to guarantee that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively peaceful as well as to remove the entire Security Council sanctions and the multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran’s nuclear program.

 

            We are willing to guarantee that our nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. But we will not compromise our technical advancement or our scientists.

 

            No one can go back in time. There has been sacrifice made. Today abilities have changed greatly than the past. There is know-how and expertise come by none of which could be forgotten. Pressure and sanctions have also proved ineffective.

 

            I appeal for these illusions not to derail a process that could put an end to a pointless crisis.

 

(Translation via the Young Journalists Club and AFP)

 

Excerpts from Secretary of State Kerry’s Op-ed in The Washington Post

 

            All along, these negotiations have been about a choice for Iran’s leaders. They can agree to the steps necessary to assure the world that their country’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful and not be used to build a weapon, or they can squander a historic opportunity to end Iran’s economic and diplomatic isolation and improve the lives of their people.

 

            Diplomacy and leadership are marked by tough calls. This shouldn’t be one of them.

 

            Iranian officials have stated repeatedly and unambiguously that they have no intention of building a nuclear weapon and that their nuclear activities are designed solely to fulfill civilian needs. Assuming that’s true, it’s not a hard proposition to prove.

 

            The United States and our partners have demonstrated to Iran how serious we are. During the negotiations to reach the Joint Plan of Action, we extended our hand to the Iranians and met with them directly to understand what Iran wanted from its nuclear program. Along with our international partners, we helped chart a path that would allow Iran to have a domestic program for exclusively peaceful purposes. We proved that we were flexible in offering financial relief.

 

            Throughout these talks, Iran’s negotiators have been serious. Iran has also defied the expectations of some by meeting its obligations under the Joint Plan of Action, which has allowed time and space for the comprehensive negotiations to proceed. Specifically, Iran has been eliminating its stockpile of higher levels of enriched uranium, limited its enrichment capability by not installing or starting up additional centrifuges, refrained from making further advances at its enrichment facilities and heavy-water reactor, and allowed new and more frequent inspections. In exchange, the European Union and the P5+1 have provided limited financial relief to Iran, even as the architecture of international sanctions and the vast majority of sanctions themselves remained firmly in place.

 

            Now Iran must choose. During the comprehensive negotiations, the world has sought nothing more than for Iran to back up its words with concrete and verifiable actions. We have, over the past several months, proposed a series of reasonable, verifiable and easily achievable measures that would ensure Iran cannot obtain a nuclear weapon and that its program is limited to peaceful purposes. In return, Iran would be granted phased relief from nuclear-related sanctions.

 

            What will Iran choose? Despite many months of discussion, we don’t know yet. We do know that substantial gaps still exist between what Iran’s negotiators say they are willing to do and what they must do to achieve a comprehensive agreement. We also know that their public optimism about the potential outcome of these negotiations has not been matched, to date, by the positions they have articulated behind closed doors.

 

            These gaps aren’t caused by excessive demands on our part. On the contrary, the E.U. and P5+1 negotiators have listened closely to Iran’s questions and concerns and showed flexibility to the extent possible consistent with our fundamental goals for this negotiation. We have worked closely with Iran to design a pathway for a program that meets all of the requirements for peaceful, civilian purposes.

 

            There remains a discrepancy, however, between Iran’s professed intent with respect to its nuclear program and the actual content of that program to date. The divide between what Iran says and what it has done underscores why these negotiations are necessary and why the international community united to impose sanctions in the first place.

 

            Iran’s claim that the world should simply trust its words ignores the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency has reported since 2002 on dozens of violations by Iran of its international nonproliferation obligations, starting in the early 1980s. The U.N. Security Council responded by adopting four resolutions under Chapter VII, requiring Iran to take steps to address these violations. These issues cannot be dismissed; they must be addressed by the Iranians if a comprehensive solution is to be reached. These are not just the expectations of any one country, but of the community of nations.

 

            To gain relief from sanctions, the world is simply asking Iran to demonstrate that its nuclear activities are what it claims them to be.

            If Iran is able to make these choices, there will be positive outcomes for the Iranian people and for their economy. Iran will be able to use its significant scientific know-how for international civil nuclear cooperation. Businesses could return to Iran, bringing much needed investment, jobs and many additional goods and services. Iran could have greater access to the international financial system. The result would be an Iranian economy that begins to grow at a significant and sustainable pace, boosting the standard of living among the Iranian population. If Iran is not ready to do so, international sanctions will tighten and Iran’s isolation will deepen.

 

Click here for the full text.

 

British Foreign Secretary Hague's July 2 statement

            “This is a crucial moment in international efforts to resolve one of the most challenging foreign policy issues of our day. The UK is fully committed to reaching an agreement which ensures Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. To achieve this, Iran will need to be realistic about the steps required to resolve the international community’s serious concerns about its nuclear programme. We will not accept a deal at any price. A deal that does not provide sufficient assurances that Iran will not develop a nuclear weapon is not in the interests of the UK, the region or the international community.

 

            “Achieving an agreement is far from certain. Significant differences remain between the E3+3 and Iran which are yet to be bridged. But I am convinced that the current negotiations are the best opportunity we have had in years to resolve this issue. Over the next three weeks, an intensive effort will be required by all sides. We will continue to work closely with our E3+3 partners to test to the full the scope for achieving the deal the international community requires. The benefits of a comprehensive deal for Iran are clear: if Iran is willing to take the steps needed, significant economic benefits will follow. Ultimately, this would lead to the lifting of all nuclear related sanctions and Iran being treated like any other non-nuclear weapons state.”

 

Putin: No More Double Standards

Vladimir Putin's remarks at a conference of Russian Federation ambassadors, July 1, 2014:

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I would like to begin by saying that the Foreign Ministry and our embassies are under a lot of pressure; we see this, we are aware of this, but this pressure will not be reduced. It will only increase, just as the requirement to show efficiency, precision and flexibility in our actions to ensure Russia’s national interests.

You know how dynamic and unpredictable international developments may sometimes be. They seem to be pressed together and unfortunately are not all of a positive nature. The potential for conflict is growing in the world, old contradictions are growing ever more acute and new ones are being provoked. We come across such developments, often unexpectedly, and we observe with regret that international law is not working, the most basic norms of decency are not complied with and the principle of all-permissiveness is gaining the upper hand.

We are observing this in Ukraine as well. We need to understand clearly that the events provoked in Ukraine are the concentrated outcome of the notorious deterrence policy. As you may know, its roots go deep into history and it is clear that unfortunately, this policy did not end with the end of the Cold War.

In Ukraine, as you may have seen, at threat were our compatriots, Russian people and people of other nationalities, their language, history, culture and legal rights, guaranteed, by the way, by European conventions. When I speak of Russians and Russian-speaking citizens I am referring to those people who consider themselves part of the broad Russian community, they may not necessarily be ethnic Russians, but they consider themselves Russian people.

What did our partners expect from us as the developments in Ukraine unfolded? We clearly had no right to abandon the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol to the mercy of nationalist and radical militants; we could not allow our access to the Black Sea to be significantly limited; we could not allow NATO forces to eventually come to the land of Crimea and Sevastopol, the land of Russian military glory, and cardinally change the balance of forces in the Black Sea area. This would mean giving up practically everything that Russia had fought for since the times of Peter the Great, or maybe even earlier – historians should know.

I would like to make it clear to all: this country will continue to actively defend the rights of Russians, our compatriots abroad, using the entire range of available means – from political and economic to operations under international humanitarian law and the right of self-defence.

I would like to stress that what happened in Ukraine was the climax of the negative tendencies in international affairs that had been building up for years. We have long been warning about this, and unfortunately, our predictions came true.

You know about the latest efforts to restore, to maintain peace in Ukraine. Foreign Ministry staff and the Minister himself took an active part in this. You know about the numerous telephone conversations we had on this subject.

Unfortunately, President Poroshenko has resolved to resume military action, and we failed – when I say ‘we’, I mean my colleagues in Europe and myself – we failed to convince him that the road to a secure, stable and inviolable peace cannot lie through war.

So far Mr Poroshenko was not directly linked to the orders to begin military action, and only now did he take full responsibility, and not only military, but political as well, which is much more important.

We also failed to agree to make public the statement approved by the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine on the need to maintain peace and search for mutually acceptable solutions.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that after the ceasefire was declared, no substantive, as you say, negotiations on the settlement of the situation ever began. Virtually, a disarmament ultimatum was given. However, even the ceasefire was not bad overall, though not enough to settle the situation on a long-term basis in a way that would be acceptable to all the people living in the country, including those in its southeast.

A constitution was made public, but it was never discussed.  Even within Ukrainian society there is a discussion of whether it is good or bad, but nobody definitely ever discussed it with the east.

Of course, everything that is going on in Ukraine is the internal affair of the Ukrainian state. It pains us to see people dying, especially civilians. As you may know, the number of refugees in the Russian Federation is growing. We will of course provide assistance to all those who need it. However, killing journalists is unacceptable. I reminded the Ukrainian President of this yesterday yet again.

In my view, we are observing a focused effort to liquidate all media representatives. This applies to both Russian and foreign journalists. Who could be afraid of fair reporting? Probably those, who are committing crimes. We strongly hope that the Ukrainian authorities act on their promises to carefully investigate the crimes.

More new hotspots are appearing on the world map. There is a deficit of security in Europe, in the Middle East, South-East Asia, in the Asia-Pacific region and in Africa. The global economic, financial and trade systems are becoming unbalanced, and moral and spiritual values are being washed out.

There is hardly any doubt that the unipolar world order did not come to be. Peoples and countries are raising their voices in favour of self-determination and civilizational and cultural identity, which conflicts with the attempts by certain countries to maintain their domination in the military sphere, in politics, finance, the economy and in ideology.

I know this has no direct bearing on us, however what is being done to the French banks can cause nothing but indignation in Europe in general and here as well. We are aware of the pressure our American partners are putting on France to force it not to supply Mistrals to Russia. We even know that they hinted that if France does not deliver the Mistrals, the sanctions will be quietly lifted from their banks, or at least they will be significantly minimised.

What is this if not blackmail? Is this the right way to act on the international arena? Besides, when we speak of sanctions, we always assume that sanctions are applied pursuant to Article 7 of the UN Charter. Otherwise, these are not sanctions in the true legal sense of the word, but something different, some other unilateral policy instrument.

In the past 20 years, our partners have been trying to convince Russia of their good intentions, their readiness to jointly develop strategic cooperation. However, at the same time they kept expanding NATO, extending the area under their military and political control ever closer to our borders. And when we rightfully asked: “Don’t you find it possible and necessary to discuss this with us?” they said: “No, this is none of your business.” Those who continue insisting on their exclusivity strongly dislike Russia’s independent policy. The events in Ukraine prove this. They also prove that a model of relations full of double standards does not work with Russia.

Nevertheless, I hope pragmatism will eventually prevail. We need to get rid of ambitions, of attempts to establish a ‘world barracks’ and arrange everybody by rank, or to impose single rules of behaviour and life, and to finally begin building relations based on equality, mutual respect and concern for mutual interests. It is time we admit each other’s right to be different, the right of every country to live its own life rather than to be told what to do by someone else.

Colleagues, in its foreign policy Russia has been consistently proceeding from the notion that solutions to global and regional conflicts should be sought not through confrontation, but through cooperation and compromise. We advocate the supremacy of international law while supporting the UN’s leading role.

International law should be mandatory for all and should not be applied selectively to serve the interests of individual select countries or groups of states, and most importantly, it should be interpreted consistently. It is impossible to interpret it in one way today, and in a different way tomorrow to match the political goals of the day.

World development cannot be unified. However, we can look for common issues, see each other as partners rather than competitors, and establish cooperation between states, their associations and integration structures.

These are the principles we were guided by in the past, and they continue to guide us now as we promote integration within the CIS. Strengthening close friendly ties and developing mutually advantageous economic cooperation with our neighbours is the key strategic priority of Russia’s long-term foreign policy.

The driving force behind Eurasian integration is the trio of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union, signed in Astana on May 29, symbolises a qualitatively new step in our relations. A powerful centre of economic development that attracts business and investors, a common market is being formed in Eurasia. That is why our CIS partners show a strong interest in this union. I hope that very soon, Armenia will become a full-fledged member of this union. Negotiations with Kyrgyzstan are at an advanced stage. We are open to other Commonwealth states as well.

As we promote the Eurasian integration project, we are in no way trying to separate ourselves from the rest of the world; we are ready to consider prospects for creating free trade zones both with individual states and with regional associations and unions, primarily the European Union, of course.

Europe is our natural and most significant trade and economic partner. We strive to find new opportunities to expand our business cooperation, to open up new prospects for mutual investment and to lift trade barriers. This requires an upgrade of the legal contractual base of our cooperation and the stability and predictability of ties, primarily in such strategically important areas as energy. Stability on the entire territory of Eurasia and sustainable development of the EU economies and Russia depend on well-coordinated cooperation based on consideration for mutual interests.

We have always held high our reputation of a reliable supplier of energy resources and invested in the development of gas infrastructure. Together with European companies, as you may know, we have built a new gas transportation system called Nord Stream under the Baltic Sea. Despite certain difficulties, we will promote the South Stream project, especially since ever more European politicians and businessmen are coming to understand that someone simply wants to use Europe in their own interests, that it is becoming a hostage of someone’s near-sighted ideologised approaches.

If we return to Ukraine, the violation by Ukraine of its commitments regarding the purchase of our natural gas has become a common problem. Kiev refuses to pay on its debt. This is absolutely unacceptable. They have not paid for November-December of last year, though there were no arguments whatsoever then.

Our partners are using blatant blackmail – this is what it is. They demand an ungrounded reduction of prices on our goods, though the agreement was signed in 2009, and the parties complied with it in good faith. Now, as you may know, the court in Kiev has lifted all accusations against Ukraine’s former Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who signed the contract. Thus, the Kiev court authorities admit that they have done everything right not only by international law, but by Ukrainian law as well. But they do not wish to comply, or to pay for the product already received.

As of June 16, as you may know, we have transferred Ukraine to a pre-payment system, so they will get exactly the amount of gas they pay for. Today they do not pay; therefore, they are not getting anything – only in the so-called reverse mode. We know all about this reverse mode: it is a fake; there is no reverse mode. How can you supply gas two ways along the same pipeline? One does not have to be a gas transportation expert to understand that this is impossible. They are playing tricks with some of their partners: in fact, they are getting our gas and paying some western partners in Europe who are not receiving their volume. We are quire aware of this.

We are not taking any action at this point only because we do not want the situation to deteriorate. However, everyone should draw the proper conclusions from the situation. The main thing is that honest gas consumers and suppliers should not suffer from the actions of Ukrainian politicians and bureaucrats.

Generally, all of us – Ukraine, our European partners, and we – should seriously consider how to reduce the probability of any type of political or economic risks or force majeure situations on the continent.

In this connection, I would like to remind you that in August 2015 we will be marking 40 years of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. This anniversary is a good reason not only to turn to the basic principles of cooperation on the continent that were laid back in 1975, but also to jointly make them work, to help them take root in practical European politics.

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Conference of Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives, President of Russia website, July 1, 2014

Maliki: Iraq Deluded in Relying on US

Herewith a few excerpts from a BBC interview with Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki, his first with the international press since ISIS' seizure of Mosul and other parts of the Sunni heartland in Iraq. In the interview, on June 26, he announced the purchase of jets from Russia and Belarus. There have also been press reports of Iraq negotiating for the return of some 100 military jets moved to Iran during the 1991 Gulf War. Maliki insists that a proper air force would have prevented the victories of ISIS, and confesses that his government was deluded in signing a contract with the US for (yet to be delivered) F-16s.

"God willing within one week this force will be effective and will destroy the terrorists' dens," he said.

He said that the process of buying US jets had been "long-winded" and that the militants' advance could have been avoided if air cover had been in place.

Isis and its Sunni Muslim allies seized large parts of Iraq this month.

Mr Maliki was speaking to the BBC's Arabic service in his first interview for an international broadcaster since Isis - the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant - began its major offensive.

"I'll be frank and say that we were deluded when we signed the contract [with the US]," Mr Maliki said.

"We should have sought to buy other jet fighters like British, French and Russian to secure the air cover for our forces; if we had air cover we would have averted what had happened," he went on.

He said Iraq was acquiring second-hand jet fighters from Russia and Belarus "that should arrive in Iraq in two or three days". . . .

Mr Maliki also confirmed that Syrian forces had carried out air strikes against Islamist militants at a border crossing between Iraq and Syria.

He said Iraq had not requested the strikes but that it "welcomed" them.

"They carry out their strikes and we carry out ours and the final winners are our two countries," he said.

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Iraqi PM Nouri Maliki: Russian jets will turn tide, June 26, 2014, BBC. I think it's journalistic malpractice to get an important interview (such as this was trumpeted to be and in fact was) and then not publish the transcript. 

Lavrov: Kiev Should Negotiate with East

The following colloquy occurred at a press conference in Moscow with Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, on June 25. 

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Question: How do you see the process of settlement of the situation in the South-East of Ukraine?

Sergey Lavrov: It is necessary that Kiev understands the South-Eastern regions, hears their interests and then starts to agree on how to satisfy them, so that the population of the South-East lives in country named Ukraine as nationals having full rights, feeling that they have the right to do so. For this, we need to put some propositions on the table. They made their propositions.

We appeal to the Kiev authorities to stop using militants, battalions formed by Ihor Kolomoyskyi, – they are just extremists. You know that Ihor Kolomoyskyi simply refused to keep the cease fire. They control a significant part of the territory with its units. There are battalions of the National Guard made up of the Right Sector, as well as some minor units, which are not subordinate to anyone. The cessation of violence is a task not only for those who represent the Kiev regime and proclaimed a republic, but also for everyone, so that we attempt to remove from the equation some radical elements who do not answer to anyone. All of this has sense, only if the negotiations start. Read the plan of 15 items – none of them considers an equal negotiation process. There is a phrase there, that decentralisation will continue only after the implementation of all the 15 items, the majority of which envisages disarmament of the South-East without any guarantees. The plan of the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko proposes an amnesty. In this case, Kiev and the South-East must stop discussions of what will happen after disarmament: amnesty or they will be brought to another house of trade unions and burned.

In this situation, we should not talk using slogans, making up the largest part of the plan. This has probably been done expecting that the world community will say: “Yes, there is a peace plan having a beautiful name “peace plan of Petro Poroshenko””. At the same time, there is little interest in its content, and they appeal to us to implement it. Firstly, we cannot do this, because this plan should be implemented through negotiations with the South-East. Secondly, the content of the negotiation process should be “on the table”. Then people will react.

There was a meeting in Donetsk three days ago, which ended in a sufficiently constructive way despite its complicated beginning. There is an understanding that the cease fire will not be violated. However, the President of Ukraine announced that after the incident with the damaged helicopter, he can stop this regime earlier. Of course, this is a tragedy and it should be avoided. However, a military helicopter was flying in the place, where people outraged by many months of fighting hold positions around cities with peaceful civilians. If it was necessary to deliver medications, food or something else, relevant communication channels should have been used – it was necessary to inform them that a helicopter would come, would follow a certain route to land in a specific point and its cargo would be subjected to an inspection.

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Answers to the questions from the mass media by the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, Moscow, 25 June 2014

Stimson: Caution on Drones

The following are excerpts from the executive summary of the Task Force on US Drone Policy. The study was sponsored by the Stimson Institute and co-chaired by General John P. Abizaid (U.S. Army, Ret.) and Rosa Brooks.

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Strategic Questions

We are concerned that the Obama administration's heavy reliance on targeted killings as a pillar of US counterterrorism strategy rests on questionable assumptions, and risks increasing instability and escalating conflicts. While tactical strikes may have helped keep the homeland free of major terrorist attacks, existing evidence indicates that both Sunni and Shia Islamic extremist groups have grown in scope, lethality and influence in the broader area of operations in the Middle East, Africa and South Asia. Furthermore, US targeted strikes also create new strategic risks. These include possible erosion of sovereignty norms, blowback and risks of a slippery slope into continual conflict.

Erosion of sovereignty norms: The US government takes the view that it has a legal right to use force in the territories of foreign sovereign states when those states are unwilling or unable" to take what the United States considers appropriate action to eliminate what it sees as imminent threats. But inevitably, assessments of what constitutes an imminent threat to the United States and what would constitute appropriate action are somewhat subjective in nature; the United States may view the use of force as justified even when US allies and partners do not. The US use of force in sovereign nations whose consent is questionable or nonexistent may encourage other states to follow suit with their own military platforms or commercial entities.

Blowback: Civilian casualties, even if relatively few, can anger whole communities, increase anti-US sentiment and become a potent recruiting tool for terrorist organizations. Even strikes that kill only terrorist operatives can cause great resentment, particularly in contexts in which terrorist recruiting efforts rely on tribal loyalties or on an economically desperate population. UAV strikes by the United States have also generated a backlash in states not directly affected by the strikes, in part due to the perception that such strikes cause excessive civilian deaths, and in part due to concerns about sovereignty, transparency, accountability and other human rights and rule of law issues.

Slippery Slope: The increasing use of lethal UAVs may create a slippery slope leading to continual or wider wars. The seemingly low-risk and low-cost missions enabled by UAV to may encourage the United States to fly such missions more often, pursuing targets with UAVs that would be deemed not worth pursuing if manned aircraft or special operation forces had to be put at risk. For similar reasons, however, adversarial states may be quicker to use force against American UAVs than against US manned aircraft or military personnel. UAVs also create an escalation risk inso-far as they may lower the bar to enter a conflict, without increasing the likelihood of a satisfactory outcome.

The US use of lethal UAVs for targeted strikes outside of hot battlefields is likely to be imitated by other states. Such potential future increase in the use of lethal UAV strikes by foreign states may cause or increase instability, and further increase the risk of wid¬ening conflicts in regions around the globe.

Lack of Strategic Analysis: In recent years, US targeted strikes involving UAVs have gone from a relative rarity to a relatively common practice in Pakistan and Yemen. As the number of strikes increases, so, too, does the strategic risk. To the best of our knowledge, however, the US executive branch has yet to engage in a serious cost-benefit analysis of targeted UAV strikes as a routine counterterrorism tool.

There are numerous non-kinetic means of combatting terrorism; some of these — e.g., efforts to disrupt terrorist communications and finances — can easily be combined with targeted strikes, while others — e.g., efforts to build friendly relationships with local communities and inspire cooperation — may be less easily combined. A serious counterterrorism strategy needs to consider carefully, and constantly reassess, the balance between kinetic action and other counterterrorism to and the potential unintended consequences of increased reliance on lethal UAVs.

Legal and Ethical Issues

Transparency: The administration has disclosed details relating to only a handful of targeted strikes against American citizens: for the most part, the identities of those targeted and the basis for their targeting have not been disclosed. Details relating to incidents that may have involved civilian casualties also have not been disclosed_ In formal court filings, the administration continues to state that it will neither confirm nor deny particular strikes, or even the existence of such strikes as a general matter.

We recognize that US officials frequently have compelling reasons to refrain from providing some of this information to the public, and we believe that US government decision-makers make targeting decisions in good faith and with genuine care. Nonetheless, we are concerned by the continuing lack of transparency relating to US targeted killings.

Law versus the Rule of Law: From a US government perspective, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaida and its 'associated forces." As an international law matter, the existence of an armed conflict triggers the applicability of the law of armed conflict, which permits the United States to target al-aids operatives as enemy combatants. By extension, members of organizations that fight alongside al-Qaida are also targetable as co-belligerents — and unlike ordinary domestic law or international human rights law, the law of armed conflict does not require the United States to provide "due process" to enemy combatants before targeting them. International law also recognizes that states have the right to use armed force outside their own borders when doing so is necessary to prevent an imminent attack, and US officials have therefore argued that targeted strikes against terror suspects are permitted both under the law of armed conflict and under the international law of self-defense.

These are plausible interpretations of the law, and we disagree with those critics who have declared that US targeted killings are "illegal." But changing technologies and events have made it increasingly difficult to apply the law of armed conflict and the international law relating to the use of force in a consistent and principled manner, leading to increasing divergence between "the law" and core rule of law principles that traditionally have animated US policy.

The rise of transnational non-state terrorist organizations confounds preexisting legal categories. In a conflict so sporadic and protean, the process of determining where and when the law of armed conflict applies, who should be considered a combatant and what count as 'hostilities" is inevitably fraught with difficulty. While our military and intelligence communities have grown increasingly adept both at identifying and confirming the identities of al-Qaida affiliates and at precise and careful targeting, the criteria used to determine who might be considered targetable remain unknown to the public. Similarly, it is difficult to understand how the US government determines the imminence of unknown types of future attacks being planned by unknown individuals.

These enormous uncertainties are multiplied further when the United States relies on intelligence and other targeting information provided by a host nation government: how can we be sure we are not being drawn into a civil war or being used to target the domestic political enemies of the host state leadership?

The legal norms governing armed conflicts and the use of force look clear on paper, but the changing nature of modern conflicts and security threats has rendered them almost incoherent in practice, Basic categories such as "battlefield: "combatant" and "hostilities" no longer have clear or stable meaning. When this happens, the rule of law is threatened. The United States was founded upon rule of law principles, and historically has sought to ensure that its own actions, international law and the actions of foreign states are consistent with these principles. Today, however, despite the undoubted good faith of US decision-makers, it would be difficult to conclude that US targeted strikes are consistent with core rule of law norms.

International Precedents: From the perspective of many around the world, the United States currently appears to claim, in effect, the legal right to kill any person it determines is a member of al-Qaida or its as forces, in any state on Earth, at any time, based on secret criteria and secret evidence, evaluated in a secret process by unknown and largely anonymous individuals — with no public disclosure of which organizations are considered "associated forces" (or how combatant status is determined or how the United States defines 'participation in hostilities"), no means for anyone outside that secret process to raise questions about the criteria or validity of the evidence, and no means for anyone outside that process to identify or remedy mistakes or abuses. US practices set a dangerous precedent that may be seized upon by other states — not all of which are likely to behave as scrupulously as US officials.

Democratic Accountability: Increased US reliance on lethal UAVs in cross-border targeted strikes also poses challenges to democracy and the American system of checks and balances. While we understand the administration's reasons for considering additional transparency difficult, the effect of the lack of transparency is that the United States has been fighting what amounts to a covert, multi-year killing program. Without additional information, the citizenry cannot evaluate US targeted strikes.

Unmanned aerial vehicle strikes also raise questions about the continued efficacy of traditional congressional oversight mechanisms. The Obama administration continues to rely on the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) as the primary domestic legal basis for US targeted strikes outside of "hot" battlefields, but the administration's interpretation of the AUMF is extraordinarily broad — and even many former executive branch officials question whether Congress intended to authorize such an unbounded conflict when the AUMF was passed in 2001.

The covert or unacknowledged nature of most UAV targeted strikes also makes it difficult for Congress to perform its vital oversight functions. CIA UAV strikes constitute “covert action" under US law, which means that the CIA need not give prior notice of particular covert operations to any members of Congress except the so-called 'Gang of Eight." After a covert action, the executive branch is required to notify the full intelligence committees, but not the full Congress.

By law, the US military is prohibited from engaging in covert action. It is important to emphasize, however, that the military is not prohibited from engaging in secret, unacknowledged activities that are intended to remain unacknowledged, as long as these activities constitute "traditional military activities" under US law.

From the perspective of laypersons, both the CIA and the military can thus engage in covert strikes in the colloquial sense of the term. But while covert action undertaken by the CIA requires a presidential finding and notification — even if after the fact — of the congressional intelligence committees, secret, unacknowledged strikes carried out by the US military need not be reported to the intelligence committees, as the military reports instead to the House and Senate Armed Services committees.

At best, this fragmented oversight system creates confusion and a danger that critical issues may slip through the cracks. This fragmented oversight system is particularly problematic given that in practice, the military and CIA generally work together quite closely when planning and executing targeted UAV strikes: few strikes are "all military" or "all CIA." The differing CIA and military reporting requirements create a risk of executive branch "forum shopping,' tempting the executive branch to place a given targeted strike under the direction and control of whichever entity is deemed to have the most accommodating committee members. Even when the appropriate congressional committees are fully briefed, the classified nature of targeted strikes, whether CIA or military, makes oversight a challenge.

Future Technological Developments

UAV technologies will continue to evolve rapidly. Looking into the near future, it seems likely that an increasing number of weapons will be adapted for use on UAV platforms such that any weapon developed for a manned aircraft will soon be launch-able from an unmanned aircraft. UAVs will become more interoperable, and system software likely will evolve to integrate multiple UAVs across an entire "combat cloud." Autonomous UAV capabilities will also likely be developed.

These likely future technological developments have the potential to be used both for good and for ill, and the time to discuss their potential implications is now Among other things, we will need to reevaluate existing UAV-related Federal Aviation Administration rules and export control rules; at the moment, US export control rules for UAVs do not appear well-suited to advancing US national security objectives.

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Recommendations and Report of the Task Force on US Drone Policy (pdf), The Stimson Center, June 2014, pp. 10-14

Kerry: Strategy for Iraq and Syria

John Kerry’s visit to the Middle East featured trips to Cairo, Baghdad, Erbil (in Kurdistan), Paris (to meet with Saudi, Emirati, and Jordian foreign ministers), and Jidda, Saudi Arabia (to meet with King Abdullah). There follows selections from a variety of interviews and statements regarding US policy in Iraq and Syria. The most important highlights are, first, that the United States finds the current Iraqi government unacceptable in a whole variety of ways and, second, that it wouldn't think of interfering in domestic Iraqi politics to force a solution upon them. Also, Kerry calls strenuously for a unity government in Iraq but claims not to have raised or discussed with Prime Minister Maliki the question of a salvation government. 

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Kerry’s Statement at the US Embassy in Baghdad, June 23:

So this is a critical moment for Iraq’s future. It is a moment of decision for Iraq’s leaders, and it’s a moment of great urgency. Iraq faces an existential threat, and Iraq’s leaders have to meet that threat with the incredible urgency that it demands. The very future of Iraq depends on choices that will be made in the next days and weeks. And the future of Iraq depends primarily on the ability of Iraq’s leaders to come together and take a stand united against ISIL – not next week, not next month, but now.

In each of my meetings today, I stressed that urgency and I stressed the responsibility of Iraq’s leaders to act, whether the meeting with Prime Minister Maliki, with speaker Nujaifi, with ISCI leader Hakim, or Foreign Minister Zebari, I emphasize that defending Iraq against ISIL depends largely on their ability – all of them – to form a new government and to do it quickly. It is essential that Iraq’s leaders form a genuinely inclusive government as rapidly as possible within their own constitutional framework. . . .

The President understands very clearly that supporting Iraq in the struggle at this time is part of meeting our most important responsibility: The security of the American people, fighting terrorism, and standing by our allies. Iraq is a strategic partner of the United States, with shared interests in countering the scourge of terrorism, maintaining stability of the global energy markets, and easing the sectarian polarization that plagues this region. That’s how we have to understand the stakes here in Iraq, and that’s why we have to understand the serious threat that ISIL poses to Iraq and the urgent need for Iraq’s security forces to therefore be well-supplied, well-equipped, and well-trained. That is why President Obama has prepared a range of options for Iraq, including enhanced intelligence, joint operation centers, steady supplies of munitions, and advisors to work with and support some of Iraq’s best units.

With this support, we are living up to our Strategic Framework Agreement. The support will be intense, sustained, and if Iraq’s leaders take the necessary steps to bring the country together, it will be effective. It will allow Iraqi security forces to confront ISIL more effectively and in a way that respects Iraq’s sovereignty while also respecting America’s and the region’s vital interests. The Strategic Framework Agreement also commits the United States to support Iraq’s constitutional process. That is specifically stated, and that is part of why I stressed in today’s meetings the importance of keeping the constitutional timeline and of forming a new government as soon as possible, because forming a new government is critical to the ability of Iraq to be able to make progress and be successful. . . .

The United States is not choosing any leader; we are not making any preconditions with respect to who can or can’t take part. That is up to Iraq. It’s up to the people of Iraq to make that decision. And what we asked for today is also very much in line with the message that Grand Ayatollah Sistani offered just a few days ago. As I told Iraqi leaders today, and as I’ve made clear to my counterparts in the region, neither the United States nor any other country has the right to pick who leads Iraq. That is up to the people of Iraq. So it is when all of Iraq’s people can shape Iraq’s future, when the legitimate concerns and aspirations of all of Iraq’s communities – Sunni, Shia, Kurd – are all respected, that is when Iraq is strongest. And that is when Iraq will be the most secure. . . .

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With Margaret Brennan of CBS News, June 24:

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, both you and the President have said that a safe haven for ISIS is a national security threat for the United States. But that safe haven already exists, and it’s in Syria. Now it’s in Iraq. So how do you actually reverse those gains?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, first of all, it’s not a safe haven at this point in time.

QUESTION: Syria’s not?

SECRETARY KERRY: I would say it’s not particularly safe. They’ve been kicked around and attacked by the moderate opposition and by others there, including Assad, so they’re moving around, and may be one of the reasons that they chose to move into this other territory. But look, the bottom line is the President and I stand by that, absolutely. And the President is carefully putting together an appropriate counterterrorism strategy to deal with this, but you have to deal with it thoughtfully. And that is exactly what we’re doing.

If the President were to just make some decision to strike here or there, there’s no backup, there’s no “there” there in the Iraqi Government, it could be completely wasted. It’s not a pathway to victory. So what you need to do first is get the government formation done here in Iraq. You need to have leadership that can unify Iraq, reconstitute the military, the army itself here in Iraq, and help them to be able to push back.

There will also be a need to – and President Barzani talked to me about this here today. He said there’s no pure military victory here; you’ve got to have a political solution. And a political solution will involve empowering the people in the communities where they are now to push back against them. That’s what happened originally in Anbar Province, in Fallujah way back a number of years ago, and so you’ve got to sort of put together an appropriate strategy, which is precisely what the President is doing. . . .

SECRETARY KERRY: . . . I’m sure he’d like to have the United States have – become his air force. But the question is: Is he prepared to become a legitimate government? Is the government here prepared to do what’s necessary?

QUESTION: Maliki, you’re talking about?

SECRETARY KERRY: Not just Maliki. Will they all come together in a unified government that has the ability to make whatever the President decides to do a success? It would be a complete and total act of irresponsibility for the President just to order a few strikes, but there’s no government, there’s no backup, there’s no military, there’s nothing there that provides the capacity for success.

So what we are doing is a deliberate, careful, thoughtful approach, listening to the people here, listening to the allies, listening to the partner countries in the region, and putting together something that can work. And the President always reserves the right, as he does anywhere in the world in any crisis, to use force if it’s going to be to the advantage of a particular strategy. And he reserves that right. But he and I and our government are insisting that the constitutional process needs to be respected in Iraq, there needs to be a unity government that is prepared to stand up to ISIL, prepared to reconstitute the military, prepared to make the decisions that actually can turn the present . . .

SECRETARY KERRY: What I’ve learned is – on this trip – that there’s a great dissatisfaction here in Iraq with the current government. And I ran into a universal sense of a commitment, a desire by Iraqis to make up for the mistakes that have been made in the past. Now, what that means in terms of personalities or individuals who might fill one role or another, I can’t tell you. That’s up to Iraqis.

What we did impress on people – what I did impress on people – was the urgency of their making this decision, of following the constitutional process, and providing a framework within which the friends of Iraq have an ability to be able to be helpful. Without a government that is confident and prepared to move forward and bring the unity that is necessary, it’s very difficult to see how you can be successful in taking on ISIL, at least in its current format.

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Interview with Kim Ghattas of BBC, June 24, 2014

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, that’s exactly what a government formation process is about. It’s not up to the United States of America or some other country to come prancing in and tell Iraqis who their leaders ought to be or what they need to do. What we’re trying to do is honor a process. They have chosen to have democracy. They have a constitution. They have a constitutional process by which they now will choose a new government after they have elections. I mean, 14 million Iraqis came out, they voted. They’ve participated in the democratic process. That’s, frankly, a huge affirmation of the constitution itself and of this democratic moment. So now it’s up to Iraqis to decide who can unify Iraq, who will they all come together and join with in an effort to seize this moment. . . .

QUESTION: So no military airstrikes before a government formation?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, I mean, barring some exigent emergency or something that predicates that the President makes a decision which he always has available to him with respect to any country or any crisis in the world. But basically, there must be a government here so that there can be a strategy going forward, because just a strike alone is not going to change the outcome. You need to have a full-fledged strategy that is being implemented which is principally a political strategy.

And as even President Barzani and his folks today said, there has to be – they concur there’s no military solution. There may be military action, but there has to be a political solution that deals with empowering the people in the communities where ISIL is today to be prepared to take them on. That takes a certain amount of preparation, strategy, implementation. And what President Obama is trying to do is encourage that process to come together as rapidly as possible, because without it everything else would be wasted.

QUESTION: We’re running out of time. I want to try to squeeze in two very quick questions. You’re fighting ISIS. You’re calling on your allies to fight ISIS. President Assad of Syria says he’s fighting ISIS. How long until the U.S. is going to turn around and work with President Assad again?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, President Assad is one of the principal reasons – the principal reason – that ISIS exists. President Assad is a magnet for jihadists and foreign fighters from around the world, and that’s why they’ve been conglomerating in Syria and spreading their tentacles out. So if President Assad really wants to fight terrorists, he would declare that he is not going to continue to serve, he will work for a transition government, and he will end the crisis of Syria. That’s the way you deal with it.

QUESTION: And a final question, Mr. Secretary, about the verdict, the sentences handed out yesterday to Al Jazeera journalists in Cairo. You were just in Cairo. You described yesterday the sentences as chilling. And yet the U.S. continues to provide Egypt with various forms of aid, including military. What is the U.S. really prepared to do at this stage to pressure Egypt to show clemency?

SECRETARY KERRY: Well, we’ve actually reduced our aid. We are not providing aid directly to the government. We provide aid to the military because there’s a military-to-military relationship which is critical to security in the Sinai, to the truce with Hamas in Gaza, to counterterrorism. And we’ve had a longstanding relationship, and the military, frankly, played a very key role in helping to bring about the elections and the transition on two occasions.

QUESTION: What about pressure now?

SECRETARY KERRY: Let me – I will come to that. And in addition to that, we are only providing assistance that goes directly to the people.

Now, we have made it clear that our – in my conversations in Egypt while I was there, I made it very, very clear that if this road towards democracy, if there isn’t a change in these, whether it’s the Al Jazeera journalists or whether it’s activists who’ve been imprisoned or others who are demonstrators who were simply caught up and still, if that doesn’t begin to change, it’s going to have a profound impact on the ability and willingness of the United States to engage. And I communicated that very directly yesterday to the foreign minister.

I do not view this, as their ministry of foreign affairs issued a statement, as somehow interference from outside. I view this as a universal standard that most countries attempt to apply to journalists or to their own citizens. That sentencing is indeed chilling and it’s a terrible message, and it will, unfortunately, have an impact, a negative impact, on Egypt’s ability to attract investment, to have stability, to begin to move in the direction it wants to go.

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Press Availability at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, June 25:

QUESTION [from James Rosen of Fox News]: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I wanted to ask about two different facets of the Iraq crisis, if I may. First, I presume you saw the comments that Prime Minister al-Maliki made in his weekly address, in which he spoke of a “national salvation government,” quote unquote, as a coup against constitutional processes in Iraq and one in which he declared his refusal to participate. I wonder what you make of those comments, whether you regard them as helpful or not to the task of government formation in Iraq, and whether it is still the professed position of the United States Government that the Obama Administration is utterly disinterested in the question of whether al-Maliki stays or goes.

And the second facet of the crisis I’d like to ask you about is this: I wonder if the disclosure that Iran has been secretly flying drones over Iraq – from an airfield in Baghdad, no less – and has been secretly shipping literally tons of military equipment to the central government in Baghdad serves effectively to complicate the United States’ own evolving military operations and diplomatic mission in Iraq, and whether in fact it represents a widening of the war there.

SECRETARY KERRY: So let me take each question. With respect to the prime minister’s remarks about a so-called salvation government, that is not something that I discussed with him. That is not something that was on the table in the context of our meetings while we were there. In fact, there was no discussion that I had with any of the leaders there regarding a so-called salvation government. And I’ve heard reports about it, but I’m not sure exactly what it is that he rejected or spoke to.

What I do know is that in the prime minister’s remarks today he did follow through on the commitments that he made in our discussions. He clearly committed to completing the electoral process, he committed to meeting on the 1st of July and having the Council of Representatives come together, and he committed to moving forward with the constitutional processes of government formation. And that is precisely what the United States was encouraging. He also called on all Iraqis to put aside their differences to unite in their efforts against terrorism. That is also what we had discussions about.

So what he said today with respect to the things we talked about was entirely in line with the conversations that I had with him when I was there. And the constitutional process that we’ve urged all Iraqis to commit to at this time, we believe is critical to the ability to form a government.

Now, Iraqis will decide that. And the United States is not disinterested in what happens in a future leadership, but the United States is not going to engage in the process of suggesting to Iraqis who that ought to be. It’s up to Iraqis to make those decisions. And we have stated clearly that we have an interest in a government that can unite Iraqis that, like Grand Ayatollah Sistani said, will not repeat the mistakes of the past and go backwards but can actually bring people together. It’s up to Iraqis to decide who has the ability to do that and who represents that future.

With respect to Iran and its intentions and role in Iraq, frankly, you should best direct that question to Iran and to the Government of Iraq. But from our point of view, we’ve made it clear to everyone in the region that we don’t need anything to take place that might exacerbate the sectarian divisions that are already at a heightened level of tension. And so it’s very important that nothing take place that contributes to the extremism or could act as a flash point with respect to the sectarian divide.

Remarks by Secretary Kerry, June 2014 (various dates), US Department of State

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From Michael R. Gordon, Saudi King Promises Help in Delicate Effort to Unite Factions in Iraq, New York Times, June 27, 2014:

“Both the secretary and the king believe that the security challenges that Iraq faces require a new government,” said the State Department official, referring to the government formation process underway in Baghdad. 

 “The two shared a view that all of Iraq’s communities should be participating on an urgent basis in the political process to allow it to move forward, and that both the secretary and King Abdullah in their conversations with Iraqi leaders would convey that message directly to them,” added the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under State Department protocol.